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A Rage Shared By Law:
Post-September 11 Racial Violence
as Crimes of Passion-
Muneer I. Ahmad
INTRODUCTION
September 11 will long be associated with unthinkable violence. The
sheer magnitude of the terrorist attacks, the visual imagery of the collaps-
ing towers of the World Trade Center, and the extensive media attention
given to the victims have defined the violence of September 11 in unitary
terms. But in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, another form of violence
spread across the country: in the days and weeks after September 11, over
one thousand bias incidents against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians
were reported.' These incidents, including the murders of as many as
* I borrow the phrase "a rage shared by law" from Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress. Modern Law
Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1393 (1997) (referring to "a rage shared by
the law").
I. Throughout this article, I refer to the post-September II experience of Arabs, Muslims, and
South Asians. These are partially overlapping categories which are both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive of the racial violence I seek to address. As I argue in greater detail below, see infra notes 71-
81 and accompanying text, post-September II hate violence and governmental profiling regimes have
helped to create a new racial construct of "Muslim-looking" people. Because this new racial category is
informed by various characteristics, both real and perceived, such as religion, skin color, other aspects
of phenotypic appearance, name, national origin, dress, language, and accent, in theory and in practice
it encompasses a broad range of racial and ethnic communities. Thus, hate violence may be directed
toward Sikhs or non-Muslim Latinos because of a mistaken assumption that they are Muslim or Arab.
See infra note 75 and accompanying text. However, not all "Muslim-looking" people have been
affected equally in the aftermath of September 11. Hate violence has been directed primarily toward
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians (and Sikhs in particular). Similarly, governmental profiling has
often been framed in terms of national origin, although not all Arab, Muslim, and South Asian nationals
have been subject to the same restrictions. (For example, Indians were not subject to the government's
Special Registration program. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.) I recognize the discursive and
imperfect nature of the terminology I have chosen, but for the most part adhere to it rather than using
the "Muslim-looking" category for two reasons. First, it roughly describes the communities for whom I
believe the most post-September II violence has been intended or by whom the most violence has been
experienced, even if they have not experienced all forms of post-September II violence equally.
Second, each of the categories in my grouping-Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians-has a social and
political salience as an identity group with which individuals self-identify. In contrast, the "Muslim-
looking" category is purely an ascriptive identity, and an absurd and incoherent one at that. My
reservations about it notwithstanding, I use the term "Muslim-looking" from time to time in this Article
to emphasize that it is not only Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians who are affected by post-September
II hate violence and governmental profiling, even if it is these communities that have been most
dramatically transformed by these practices.
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nineteen people, assaults of scores of others, vandalism of homes, busi-
nesses and places of worship, and verbal harassment of countless individu-
als, form part of the subterranean history of September 11. While the
violence of September 11 itself is largely thought to have been incompre-
hensible, post-September 11 hate violence is remarkable precisely because
it is something we can understand. Although condemned as individual acts
of criminality, the phenomenon of hate violence toward Arabs, Muslims,
and South Asians is one that appeared to need little explanation; it was ac-
cepted as a regrettable, but expected, response to the terrorist attacks. As
early as September 12, 2001, major newspapers reported predictions of the
violence against these communities.
2
The physical violence exercised upon the bodies of Arabs, Muslims,
and South Asians has been accompanied by a legal and political violence
toward these communities. In the first two years after September 11, the
United States has developed a corpus of immigration law and law en-
forcement policy that by design or effect applies almost exclusively to
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians. These laws operate in tandem with the
individual acts of physical violence that have been carried out against these
same communities, thereby aiding and abetting hate violence. Taken to-
gether, the multiple assaults on the bodies and rights of Arabs, Muslims,
and South Asians produce a psychological violence as well and reracialize
the communities they target as "Muslim-looking" foreigners unworthy of
membership in the national polity.
Having occurred in a time of national tragedy, and in the wake of a far
grander spectacle of violence, it is perhaps inevitable that the hate violence
against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians would receive short shrift in
governmental, media, or public attention. This Article attempts to trace a
genealogy of the racial violence in the aftermath of September 11, with
three purposes in mind: (1) to explicate the mutually reinforcing relation-
ship between individual hate crimes and governmental racial profiling, and
the racialization they jointly effect; (2) to explore the psychological moti-
vations for individual hate crimes against Arabs, Muslims, and South
Finally, I use the "Arab, Muslim, and South Asian" and "Muslim-looking" categories to describe
both citizens and noncitizens of the United States. While much of the post-September II hate violence
and governmental profiling has been experienced by noncitizens, U.S. citizens have been subjected to
such violence as well.
2. See, e.g., Edward Hegstrom & Tara Dooley, Houston Muslims, Arab Leaders Condemn
Attacks, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 12, 2001, at 24A (noting local and national fear of harassment among
Muslims); Caryle Murphy & Emily Wax, Muslims Condemn Acts, Fear Reprisals; D.C. Area Islamic
Groups Urged to Take Precautions, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at B6 (noting that Muslims who wear
religious attire were urged to stay out of public areas); Larry B. Stammer & Teresa Watanabe, Muslims
in Southland Brace for Retaliation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A38 (reporting Islamic schools,
centers and mosques closed for fear of revenge assaults); Robert Tomsho, A Day of Terror: Islamic-
Americans Grapple with Quick Backlash, WALL ST. J. ABSTRACTS, Sept. 12, 2001, at A12 (reporting
Muslim-American organizations' preparation for backlash).
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Asians, and how state-sponsored violence against these communities has
reflected that psychology; and (3) to illuminate how the interrelationship
among different systems of subordination serves to normalize such vio-
lence.3
There is a danger that hate violence against Arabs, Muslims, and
South Asians is understood as a passing, or past, phenomenon. Such an
assumption ignores the steady stream of violence directed against these
communities long after September 11. Nearly two years after the terrorist
attacks, this violence continued, including: the stabbing in the back of a
Muslim woman in Virginia, while her perpetrator called her a "terrorist
pig"4; the brutal beating of a Hindu pizza delivery man in Massachusetts
who was mistaken for a Muslim'; and a cross-burning in front of an Islamic
center in Maryland.6 Events such as these suggest that, rather than an iso-
lated phenomenon, the racialization of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians
after September 11 is ongoing. Indeed, the reconstruction of Arab, Muslim,
and South Asian identity after September 11 constitutes a major shift in
American racial conceptualization. Hate violence has played a major role
in this process, and continues to do so.7 Moreover, the very persistence of
this violence suggests that it and underlying biases toward Arabs, Muslims,
and South Asians have been normalized.
By situating post-September 11 violence within the history of hate
violence in the United States, we can begin to understand how the recent
experiences of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians figure into an American
tradition of violence as a means of racial differentiation. However, such
historical context also suggests that the violence directed toward Arabs,
3. I realize that in focusing attention on the violence done to Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians
in the United States, I open myself up to the criticism that I am implicitly downgrading the magnitude
of the violence done to the victims of the September 11 attacks. I have no interest in a comparison of
victimhood. The killings of September 11, the hate killings post-September 11, and the killings of
innocent civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq all result in the loss of life. If one is serious about the
proposition that all life is equal, then all killings are and should be subject to scrutiny.
4. See Emad Mekay, Rights: U.S. Muslims Fear Government Harassment Will Worsen, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 9, 2003, at 2003 WL 6917481.
5. See Jules Crittenden, Cops Say Attack on Pizza Guy was Hate Crime, BOSTON HERALD, June
25, 2003, at 5 (quoting local police chief as stating, "The added brutality was due to his
ethnicity ... [o]nce they looked at him, they thought he was Arabic or Islamic. They were yelling at
him, 'Go back to Iraq!' ... [h]e kept telling them that he was a Hindu from India."). A young Pakistani
man in New Jersey was also beaten to death while delivering a pizza. While the motive for this killing
has not been established, many fear that it, too, was a hate crime. See Ronald Smothers, Calls for
Justice and Mercy Over a Pakistani's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2003, at B5.
6. Jamie Stockwell, Two Teens Charged With Burning Cross Near Mosque, WASH. POST, Aug.
2, 2003, at B5.
7. More recent statistics confirm that post-September 11 violence has not ceased. The Council
on American-Islamic Relations reports that anti-Muslim acts increased by 70% in 2003 (compared with
2002). See Council on American-Islamic Relations, Unpatriotic Acts: The Status of Muslim Civil Rights
in the United States 2004, available at http://www.cair-net.org/asp/execsum2004.asp (last visited Sept.
1,2004).
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Muslims, and South Asians has been different in kind from many hate
crimes in recent memory. For example, the killings of James Byrd and
Matthew Shepard have been viewed as incomprehensible acts of violence.8
In contrast, although Americans have condemned the killings of Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians after September 11, these killings have been
understood as the result of a displaced anger, one with which many
Americans have sympathized and agreed. By this account, the perpetrators
of hate crimes against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians were not guilty
of malicious intent or depraved indifference, but of expressing a socially
appropriate emotion-overwhelming anger in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks-in socially inappropriate ways. Borrowing from criminal law, the
hate crime killings before September 11 were understood as crimes of
moral depravity, while the hate killings since September 11 have been un-
derstood as crimes of passion. Whereas crimes of moral depravity are de-
void of any justification whatsoever, crimes of passion are treated as
morally understandable though still illegal transgressions.
Applying this crime of passion motif to post-September 11 violence
reveals the role that conceptions of emotion, honor, loyalty, violation, and
betrayal have played in the national psychology after the terrorist attacks
and provides insight into the role that September 11 has played in the na-
tional discourse on immigration. Moreover, it suggests that post-September
11 violence constituted an attempt to protect male honor, which in turn
helps to explain how violence against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians
has been normalized. Finally, an understanding of the genesis of hate vio-
lence against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians sheds light on the role of
the state in furthering this violence, and on the racializing impact of such
collective violence on Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities.
In Part I of this Article, I provide an overview of the racial violence
that has occurred in the aftermath of September 11, including both individ-
ual hate crimes and governmental policies of racial profiling, and I argue
that they mutually reinforce a shared racist ideology. In Part II, I review the
construction of a new racial identity for Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians,
and the logic of fungibility whereby these and other disparate groups are
assimilated into a single category of "Muslim-looking" people. In Part III, I
discuss the psychological origins of post-September 11 hate violence
against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, and I explain how this violence
differs from a paradigmatic understanding of hate crimes that emerged in
the 1990s.
In Part IV, I explore an alternative legal framework, the "crime of
passion," and argue that this model provides a more accurate account for
the popular understanding of post-September 11 racial violence. My inter-
est here is not primarily to investigate the use of the crime of passion
8. See infra notes 115-92 and accompanying text,
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defense by the perpetrators of post-September 11 hate violence, but to
demonstrate how its traditional features undergird public and private forms
of racial violence against "Muslim-looking" people and help to normalize
such violence as understandable, although inappropriate, responses to the
terrorist attacks. I address the tension between emotionalism and reason
inherent in the legal and extralegal responses to the terrorist attacks, and I
suggest that much like in the paradigmatic crime of passion, where an en-
raged husband kills his wife's lover upon discovering them in the marital
bed, these post-September 11 responses have been understood as acts of
passion.
In Part V, I return to the relationship between individual acts of vio-
lence and governmental profiling and argue that a value symmetry of ra-
cism between the two precludes coherent state condemnation of the
individual violence. Rather, the state's condemnation of the hate violence
belies its own subscription to racist ideology with respect to Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians. I conclude that we are now in the first mo-
ments of national reconsideration of our anti-terrorism policies, and that an
important opportunity exists to make circumspect corrections to the emo-
tionally driven, racially informed policies currently in place.
I.
"PRIVATE" AND "PUBLIC" RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE AFTERMATH
OF SEPTEMBER 11
Two forms of racial violence swept across the United States in the
aftermath of September 11. The first involved what traditionally would be
classified as private violence: violence enacted by one (or more) private
actor upon another, without direct state participation. This is typified by the
thousands of physical attacks carried out by individuals against Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians after the terrorist attacks. The second form of
violence is traditionally deemed public, because of the direct involvement
of state actors. After September 11, this took the form of a broad range of
governmental policies that targeted "Muslim-looking" people.
Feminist insight counsels deep skepticism of public/private distinc-
tions because spheres of privacy are frequently the products of state action
(or inaction) and because the state is itself selectively constitutive of pri-
vate concerns. Inquiry into post-September 11 violence provides fresh evi-
dence for such skepticism, as the supposedly public and private violence
enacted against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, far from being separate
and discrete phenomena, operate in tandem.
A. "Private "Racial Violence
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, Arab, Muslim, and
South Asian communities in the United States experienced a wave of
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violence far greater in magnitude than they had ever experienced before. In
total, over one thousand separate bias incidents were reported in a period of
eight weeks, and though the rate of new incidents has slowed, it continues
today, fueled most recently by the war in Iraq.9 Chief among the post-
September 11 violence were the murders of as many as nineteen people,
including Balbir Singh Sodhi, Waqar Hasan, Adel Karas, Saed Mujtahid,
Jayantilal Patel, Surjit Singh Samra, Abdo Ali Ahmed, Abdullah
Mohammed Nimer, and Vasudev Patel.' o In addition, these incidents have
included the fire bombings of mosques, temples, and gurdwaras; assaults
by fist, gun, knife, and Molotov cocktail; acts of vandalism and property
destruction against homes and businesses; and innumerable instances of
verbal harassment and intimidation." The actual number of incidents is
impossible to know, as racial shame, uncertain immigration status, and
9. See ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, WORLD TRADE CENTER AND PENTAGON
ATTACKS: THE ANTI-ASIAN AMERICAN BACKLASH (2002), available at http://www.aaldef.org/
images/101 1011ist.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2004) [hereinafter AALDEF, WORLD TRADE CENTER]; S.
ASIAN AM. LEADERS OF TOMORROW, AMERICAN BACKLASH: TERRORISTS BRING WAR HOME IN MORE
WAYS THAN ONE (2001), available at http://www.saalt.org/biasreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2004)
(documenting 645 bias incidents occurring within just six days of September 11). Additional
information on the history and continuing reports of bias incidents is available on the website of the
Council on American-Islamic Relations, at http://www.cair-net.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2004). As
more time has passed, the physical nature of the bias has subsided, but has come to take new forms. In
particular, reports of housing and employment discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, and South
Asians have increased significantly. See AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., REPORT ON HATE
CRIMES AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB AMERICANS: THE POST-SEPTEMBER II BACKLASH 92-
103, 105-16, 120-31 (2003), available at http://www.adc.org/hatecrimes/
pdf/2003_jeportweb.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) [hereinafter ADC REPORT] (describing specific
accounts of discrimination in employment, educational institutions, and the media); LAWYERS COMM.
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A YEAR OF LosS: REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER II (2002);
NAT'L ASIAN PAC. AM. LEGAL CONSORTIUM, BACKLASH: WHEN AMERICA TURNED ON ITS OWN, A
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE 2001 AUDIT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS (2002)
[hereinafter NAPALC, BACKLASH], available at http://www.napalc.org/literature/annual-report/9-
I1 &2000_download.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
10. See Robert Hanashiro, Hate Crimes Born Out of Tragedy Create Victims, USA TODAY, Sept.
11, 2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/septll/2002-09-11-mesa_x.htm (citing the
nonprofit Campaign for Collateral Compassion for the proposition that nineteen killings are being
investigated as hate crimes); Robert E. Pierre, Victims of Hate, Now Feeling Forgotten, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 2002, at Al ("At least a dozen murders are being investigated as hate crimes by authorities.");
Jim Walsh, Roque Guilty in Sikh Murder; Insanity Defense Fails; Jury to Decide on Death Penalty,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 2003, at 1 (collecting cases of nine Arab, Muslim, or South Asian individuals
killed in the month after the September II attacks). The exact number of people killed in post-
September II hate violence is a matter of dispute. In some cases, admissions by the perpetrators make
unambiguously clear that these were hate crimes. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text. In
others, circumstances strongly suggest bias motivation, but either the perpetrators have not been
apprehended, or have refused to make statements, or have denied any bias motivation. In many of these
cases, law enforcement, families, and community groups have disagreed as to whether they were hate
crimes. Alan Cooperman, Sept. 11 Backlash Murders and the State of 'Hate'; Between Families and
Police, a Gulf on Victim Count, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at A3. For more descriptions of some of
these murders, see infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
It. See supra note 9.
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language barriers inhibit many victims of hate crimes from ever reporting
them. 12
B. "Public" Racial Violence
This physical violence against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, on
its face private, vigilante, 3 and extralegal, 14 has been accompanied by a
quickly developed and broadly applied governmental policy of racial pro-
filing of these communities. Within days after the terrorist attacks, racial
profiling emerged as the government's primary weapon of choice in the
newly declared war on terrorism. Racial profiling, a term that on
September 10 described the phenomenon of pretextual police stops of
African Americans and Latinos, came suddenly to apply to the singling out
of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians as terrorism suspects after September
11. Whereas 80% of Americans opposed racial profiling prior to
September 11, after the attacks almost the same percentage favored profil-
ing of those assumed to be Arab or Muslim. 5
The popular and political acceptance of racial profiling of Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians is represented clearly in the Bush
Administration's recently announced policy guidance to end racial profil-
ing by federal law enforcement officials. 6 The guidance purports to make
good on a series of pre-September 11 promises to end racial profiling. 7
However, it carves out a gaping exception for "law enforcement activities
involving threats to national security or the integrity of the nation's
borders."' 8 The guidance explicitly authorizes federal law enforcement
12. See DEEPA IYER, S. ASIAN AM. LEADERS OF TOMORROW, RAISING OUR VOICES, A RESOURCE
GUIDE 13 (2002) (identifying immigration status, language proficiency, fear of deportation, and
unfamiliarity with criminal justice system as reasons for under-documentation of hate crimes).
13. See Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1441 (2002) (describing post-September 11 violence as "vigilante racism").
14. See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2002)
(describing post-September I I violence as "extralegal racial profiling").
15. Nicole Davis, The Slippery Slope of Racial Profiling: From the War on Drugs to the War on
Terrorism, COLORLINES, Dec. 2001, at 2.
16. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE By FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (June 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/
guidance on-race.htm [hereinafter GUIDANCE].
17. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Videotaped Remarks to the NAACP Convention (July
9, 2001), in 37 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE U.S. 28 (2001) (describing his request for
Attorney General John Ashcroft "to develop specific recommendations to end racial profiling" and
stating that "racial profiling is wrong, and it must be ended in America"); see also Nick Anderson,
Black Lawmakers Press Ashcroft, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2001, at A 16 (stating that Ashcroft was "'eager'
to respond to Bush's call for recommendations on measures to end racial profiling"); Julian Bond &
Wade Henderson, The Bias the Candidates Deplore, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2000, at A33 (stating that
then-Governor Bush would support a federal law to end racial profiling); President George W. Bush,
Address of the President to the Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 27, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010228.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2004) (stating
that racial profiling is wrong and promising an end to racial profiling in America).
18. GUIDANCE, supra note 16.
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officials, including airport screeners and border personnel, to consider race
and ethnicity in the course of "matters of national security, border integrity
or the possible catastrophic loss of life."' 9 The result of this policy guid-
ance is to ban racial profiling in counterterrorism efforts of everyone ex-
cept Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians,20  as the profiling of these
communities is almost always on the purported basis of national security,
and because it is almost exclusively these communities that are suspected
of terrorism.2'
The national security exception is particularly troubling in light of the
federal government's abuses to date in its anti-terrorism investigations and
prevention activities, as documented by the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG), the internal watchdog of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Having
reviewed the cases of 762 noncitizens (almost all of whom are believed to
be Arab, Muslim, or South Asian) detained during the first eleven months
after September 11, the Inspector General found that the FBI and
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) "made little attempt to
distinguish" between immigrants who had potential ties to terrorism and
19. Id. The only caveats are that law enforcement officials may not rely "solely upon generalized
stereotypes," and may consider race and ethnicity only to "the extent permitted by the Constitution and
laws of the United States." Id. This is to say that with regard to terrorism matters, law enforcement
officials may engage in as much racial profiling as is constitutionally or otherwise legally permissible.
This stands in sharp contrast to the provisions of the policy guidance governing routine law
enforcement and law enforcement related to specific, non-terrorism investigations. The limitations
imposed there apply "even where the use of race or ethnicity might otherwise be lawful." Id. With
respect to specific, non-terrorism investigations, however, the guidance allows federal law enforcement
officers to "consider race and ethnicity only to the extent that there is trustworthy information, relevant
to the locality or time frame, that links persons of a particular race or ethnicity to an identified criminal
incident, scheme, or organization." Id.
20. It should also be noted that the guidance's vaguely defined rubric of "border integrity"
appears to authorize the racial profiling of Latina/os that has long taken place along the United States-
Mexico border. My thanks to Melissa Onken for this insight.
21. The policy guidance has been subject to other important criticisms as well. For example, the
National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium has noted that the guidance fails to prohibit
profiling on the basis of religion or national origin. See Press Release, Nat'l Asian Pac. Am. Legal
Consortium, DOJ's Guidance on the Misuse of Race and Ethnicity by Federal Law Enforcement
Agencies Falls Short of Presidential Commitment, Highlights Need for Federal Legislation (June 18,
2003), at http://www.napalc.org/programs/immigration/pr/2003-06_18_Profiling.htm (last visited Apr.
12, 2004). This criticism is especially important for two reasons. First, although I argue that the post-
September II profile of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians has substantial racial content, it is also
based upon appearance-based ascriptions of religion and citizenship status. In addition, the profile
could be understood as targeting individuals of specific ethnicities. Second, the history of racial
profiling prior to September II reveals that certain communities of color-Latina/os and Asian
Americans, in particular-are frequently profiled on the basis of presumed ethnicity and citizenship
status. This is especially true of Latina/os in areas proximate to the United States-Mexico border. See,
e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement: Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of Law, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 897 (2002). For other criticisms of the guidance, see Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union,
ACLU Says New Justice Department Racial Profiling Policy Lacks Enforcement Tool, Suffers from
Huge National Security Loophole (June 17, 2003), at http:/www.aclu.org/news/
NewsPrint.cfm?ID=12928&c=133 (last visited Apr. 11, 2004) (noting that the guidance "include[s] a
broad and largely undefined exception when 'national security' concerns come into play").
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those who were merely swept up by chance in the course of the federal
investigation.2 2 The OIG found further that the INS failed to serve the de-
tainees with timely notice of the charges against them, DOJ improperly
detained many of the detainees even after immigration judges had ordered
them removed, and many of the detainees were subjected to "unduly harsh"
conditions of detention, which included "a pattern of physical and verbal
abuse." 23 Two conclusions can be drawn from the report. First, in each of
these putative terrorism detentions, the government has failed to allege one
concrete terrorism connection. Although most of these detainees have been
deported for minor immigration violations, not one has been charged with
terrorist activity.24 Second, by treating all Arabs, Muslims, and South
Asians caught up in the federal dragnet as presumptively terrorists, the
government violated the due process rights of hundreds, if not thousands,
of immigrants merely because they "looked" like terrorists.
25
Between September 11 and the Bush Administration's announcement
of the new policy against racial profiling, the government has developed an
elaborate set of racial profiling practices with regard to Arabs, Muslims,
and South Asians. The policy guidance serves merely to ratify these prac-
tices, which run the gamut of law enforcement and are too voluminous to
enumerate here. However, four distinct practices of governmental racial
profiling of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians can be identified: airport
profiling, secret arrests, race-based immigration policies, and selective en-
forcement of immigration laws of general applicability.
Dozens of stories have emerged of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians
being stopped in airports.26 The most egregious incidents involved those in
22. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER II
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER I I ATTACKS (June 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
23. Id.
24. David G. Savage, High Court Refuses to Take Up Case on Post-Sept. I1 Arrests: Bush
Administration Kept Secret the Names of Middle Eastern Men Detained in a Roundup, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2004, at Al (noting that of the hundreds of men picked up for questioning after September 11, some
were deported for "minor, technical violation[s] of their immigration status"); OIG REPORT, supra note
22, at 12 (noting the types of immigration violations on which September I I detainees were arrested as
including overstaying visas and entering the country illegally); see also Laura Parker & Kevin Johnson,
Doctor Returns Home After FBI Drops Warrant, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 2001, at A3 (illustrating
examples of immigration enforcement over minor violations, including a Lebanese national picked up
for changing employers in contravention to his work visa).
25. See MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., AMERICA'S CHALLENGE:
DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER I I, at 9-10 (2003),
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/AmericasChallenge.html (last visited Apr. 1I,
2004).
26. Although many of these incidents involve profiling of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians by
airline personnel, they are properly considered within the realm of public violence because of the
statutory authority under which such profiling has been undertaken. Specifically, 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b)
grants air carriers the discretion to refuse to transport a passenger whom the carrier "decides is, or
might be, inimical to safety." 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2000) (emphasis added). Similarly, airport security
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which Arab, Muslim, and South Asian passengers were removed from
planes they had already boarded because flight attendants, pilots, or even
other passengers felt uncomfortable with them on board.27 The case of
Ashraf Khan is representative. A thirty-two-year-old Pakistani business-
man and lawful permanent resident of the United States for eleven years,
Khan boarded a Delta Airlines flight in San Antonio to attend his brother's
wedding in Pakistan.28 After Khan took his seat in first class, the pilot of
the plane told Khan that he and the crew did not feel safe with Khan on
board and had him removed.29 In Tampa, Mohamed el-Sayed, a U.S. citi-
zen of Egyptian origin denied passage on a United Airlines flight, was later
informed by an airport manager that the pilot refused to fly with el-Sayed
on board, stating, "[w]e've reviewed your profile; your name is
Mohamed."3 And in Austin, two Pakistani men were removed from an
American Airlines flight to the applause of the remaining passengers.31
Over thirty such incidents have been reported.32
Although airplane and airport incidents have been egregious, the gov-
ernment's practice of secret arrests has been far more troubling. Within
days after the terrorist attacks, the federal government began a nationwide
dragnet, arresting and detaining between 1200 and 2000 Arabs, Muslims,
and South Asians.3 While many of these individuals are believed to have
been held as material witnesses or on minor immigration violations, neither
the names of these individuals nor the nature of the charges against them
have been disclosed to the public.34 Even the exact number of such arrests
screeners, though once private, served in a quasi-public capacity, carrying out a federally mandated
policy. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted on November 19, 2001, federalized the
screeners. Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597, 597 (2001).
27. ADC REPORT, supra note 9, at 21-31.
28. Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Flying While Brown, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 19, 2001, at 14.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 15.
31. Jonathan Osborne, Passenger Ejections Seen As Profiling, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept.
29, 2001, at Al.
32. See id.; Bias Incidents Against Muslims are Soaring, Islamic Council Says, N.Y. TIMES, May
1, 2002, at A3; Sam Howe Verhovek, Americans Give in to Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001,
at Al (citing denial of three "Middle Eastern-looking" men to board a Northwest Airlines flight and
Khan's denial to fly); ADC REPORT, supra note 9, at 25-31 (chronicling ejections from airplanes by
"ordinary citizens," flight crew, and pilots). A number of legal challenges have been mounted to these
instances of airplane profiling. See, e.g., Chowdury v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1153
(N.D. Cal. 2002); Dasrath v. Cont'l Airlines, 228 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.N.J. 2002); Bavaa v. United
Airlines, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
33. See, e.g., Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law
After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295,
331 (2002) (citing the arrest and detention of approximately one thousand people as part of the DOJ
investigations into September II attacks); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 960
(2002).
34. The government's refusal to disclose this information has been upheld in Center for National
Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 1041 (2004). See Cole, supra note 33, at 960-61.
1270 [Vol. 92:1259
2004] A RAGE SHARED BYLAW 1271
is unknown, because the government has refused to release such
information.35 As the OIG report makes clear, many of the people caught
up in this investigative sweep had no connection to terrorism. Rather, they
were Arab, Muslim, and South Asian men encountered coincidentally in
the course of the government's September 1 1 investigation. 6 In a separate
program instituted after September 11, the government called in eight
thousand Arab, Muslim, and South Asian men for "voluntary" interviews
with the FBI, some of whom were deported thereafter.37
The government's most robust racial profiling practices have come in
the immigration context, most often on a theory of preventive law en-
forcement. In order to prevent future terrorist attacks, the government has
committed to using "every available tool," including the immigration
35. Cole, supra note 33, at 960.
36. See 01 REPORT, supra note 22, at 16-17 (noting arrests of individuals based on leads that
were "quite general in nature, such as a landlord reporting suspicious activity by an Arab tenant");
Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling
After September I1, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2002) (describing the arrest and detention of a Pakistani
man during an INS sweep of a Brooklyn mosque). These arrests reflect a larger government
commitment to secrecy. In addition to its refusal to disclose the names of September II detainees, the
charges against them, or even the total number of detainees, the government has closed many
immigration proceedings to the public. See Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge Michael
Creppy, to All Immigration Judges and Court Administrators [hereinafter Creppy Memorandum] (Sept.
17, 2002), available at http://archive.aclu.org/court/creppy-memo.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004). This
practice has been challenged, resulting in a circuit split. While the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the practice, the Sixth Circuit invalidated the closures. Compare N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003), with Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'g den'd, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1278 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Moreover, even before September 11, the government had expanded its use of secret evidence against
people suspected of terrorism, authorized by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) of 1996. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266 (1996). These secret evidence provisions
have, since 1997, been used almost exclusively against Arabs and Muslims, underscoring the existence
of a racial profile of Arabs and Muslims preceding September 11. See generally Akram & Johnson,
supra note 33, at 321-27; Cole, supra note 33; Douglas Montero, U.S. Secret Evidence Law Terrorizes
Innocent Arabs, N.Y. POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at 22.
37. The Attorney General announced an initial round of five thousand interviews in November
2001, followed by three thousand additional interviews announced in March 2002. The interviews were
of men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-three from countries with suspected terrorist links who
entered the United States on nonimmigrant visas after January 1, 2000. See Brook A. Masters & Cheryl
W. Thompson, U.S. Plans to Query More New Arrivals; 3,000 Foreign Nationals Added to List, WASH.
POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at A18; Jodi Wilgoren, Prosecutors Begin Effort to Interview 5,000, But Basic
Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B7; Press Conference,
U.S. Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft (Mar. 20, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/
032002agnewsconferenceedvainterviewprojectresultsannouncement.htm. As Karen Tumlin describes,
the voluntary interview program was used to selectively deport immigrants of certain nationalities:
While the [DOJ] pledged that these interviews were informational only, many immigrants
were placed in deportation proceedings as a result of technical violations discovered in this
process. The deportation of voluntary interviewees belied the purported information-
gathering aim of these interviews. Instead, the deportations confirmed fears among
immigrants and their advocates that the voluntary interview program was a veiled attempt to
rid the nation of groups the administration considered likely terrorism suspects.
Karen Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy is Reshaping Immigrant Policy, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1173, 1187 (2004) (footnote omitted).
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laws.38 Where noncitizens are involved, immigration law provides the gov-
ernment with far greater latitude to engage in preventive practices than
does the criminal law. The Supreme Court has long held that deportation is
not punishment, and therefore immigration proceedings are civil rather
than criminal.39 As such, noncitizens in immigration proceedings do not
enjoy many of the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants.
As Daniel Kanstroom describes, "This principle reduces to the basic idea
that noncitizens have no substantive claim to remain in the United States
and are therefore subject to whatever rules Congress chooses to make, even
if they are retroactive. They are not being punished; they are simply being
regulated."4 Unlike criminal defendants, noncitizens in immigration pro-
ceedings do not enjoy a presumption of innocence,41 and silence may be
used against them.4" There is no grand jury,43 no right to appointed coun-
sel,44 no speedy trial guarantee, 45 no jury trial and increasingly, no right to
38. Speaking on September 19, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft stated:
When circumstances require us to use the full force and effect of the order, we will do so. I
make no apology-I make no apology for being forceful in our enforcing the law and
requiring adherence to the law. This investigation will pursue violators and use every tool
available to us to curtail and prevent and disrupt any effort to further inflict this kind of
damage on the United States or our citizens.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS PROTECT TERRORIST NETWORKS SAYS ASHCROFT
(Sept. 19, 2001), at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/0l09191 l.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
39. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) ("While
the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as a punishment.");
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) ("The order of deportation is not a
punishment for crime.").
40. Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why
Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1895 (2000).
41. A noncitizen facing deportation bears an initial burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that he or she is lawfully present in the United States pursuant to a prior admission. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(2)(B) (2003). Only after this burden has been met does the burden shift to the government,
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizen is deportable. Id. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). The
clear and convincing standard is less stringent than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in criminal
proceedings. See Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 284-86 (1966).
42. See Bustos-Torres v. I.N.S., 898 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding Miranda
warnings are not required in deportation proceedings); Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness: Involuntary
Testimony and Silence as Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 599, 602-04
(1990).
43. Removal proceedings against a noncitizen are initiated by filing a notice to appear with the
Immigration Court. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1(a) (2003). A wide range of immigration officials are granted the
discretionary power to issue a notice to appear, including, inter alia, district directors of the
immigration service, border patrol agents, supervisory asylum officers. Id.
44. Noncitizens in removal proceedings have the right to be represented by counsel, but neither a
constitutional nor a statutory right to counsel at the government's expense. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000); see
also Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding noncitizens in removal
proceedings have no Sixth Amendment right to counsel). Failure to provide counsel at government
expense may, in theory, constitute a due process violation under the Fifth Amendment, but only in
cases where the absence of counsel results in fundamental unfairness or significant prejudice. See, e.g.,
U.S. v. Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d 227, 230-31 (8th Cir. 1995); Castro-O'Ryan v. U.S. Dep't. of
Immigration & Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir. 1987); Aguilera-Enriquez v. I.N.S., 516
F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
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release on bond pending trial or removal.46 The exclusionary rule does not
apply,47 and immigration regulations may be applied retroactively, without
violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.48 Although Fifth Amendment due proc-
ess rights apply in theory, the protections are minimal at best. The rules of
evidence do not apply, 49 and the government may use secret evidence
against the noncitizen.5 ° Moreover, the government has tried, with some
success, to close proceedings to the public." In light of these strategic ad-
vantages, it is not surprising that among the thousands of arrests that have
been made as part of the "war on terrorism," only a handful have involved
terrorism criminal prosecutions, while hundreds, if not the majority, have
been based on immigration violations."
The breadth of the federal immigration power derives not only from
the lack of positive rights granted to noncitizens, but also from the near
total deference that the courts grant the political branches in the exercise of
the immigration power pursuant to the plenary power doctrine. 3 Such
45. See Argiz v. U.S. Immigration, 704 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding
speedy trial guarantee of Interstate Agreement on Detainers not applicable to deportation hearing
because deportation is civil rather than criminal).
46. Noncitizens facing removal on the grounds of having committed certain criminal offenses
face mandatory detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000). The Attorney General has the discretion to
release certain other noncitizens on bond pending a decision regarding the noncitizen's removal. Id. §
1226(a). The favorable exercise of that discretion, however, has been constrained significantly since
September 11. For a discussion of additional restrictions on bond release, see infra notes 82-89 and
accompanying text.
47. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
48. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-96 (1952) (upholding retroactive
application of Alien Registration Act of 1940 because of inapplicability of Ex Post Facto Clause in
immigration proceedings).
49. The Federal Rules of Evidence are used as guidance in immigration courts but are not
formally applied. See Matter of D-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 827, 831 (1994) (holding the rules of evidence
generally are not applicable in immigration court proceedings). Proffered evidence need only be
"reasonable, substantial, and probative." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2000); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7
(2003) ("The immigration judge may receive in evidence any oral or written statement that is material
and relevant to any issue in the case previously made by the respondent or any other person during any
investigation, examination, hearing, or trial.").
50. See generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 & 42
U.S.C.); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 § 213, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 285-86 (2001)
(amending 8 U.S.C. § 3103a) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]. Long before obtaining this statutory
authority, the government has enjoyed court-approved use of secret evidence against noncitizens. See,
e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
5 I. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
52. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 33, at 331.
53. The plenary power doctrine has been described as the rule that "the power of Congress over
the admission of aliens to this country is absolute." RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 22.2 (2d ed. 1992). In accordance
with this doctrine, the courts have granted extraordinary deference to Congress in the regulation of
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deference removes the check on executive and legislative power that judi-
cial review normally provides. The political branches, and the executive in
particular, therefore wield a nearly free hand in the crafting and administra-
tion of immigration policies. Such unfettered discretion is inherently sub-
ject to abuse and has enabled the government's deployment of racial
profiling in immigration enforcement. 4
Immigration enforcement profiling has taken two forms: race-based
immigration policies, and selective (racist) enforcement of race-neutral
policies. First, a series of immigration policies devised since September 11
on their face single out Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians for disparate
treatment. Most blatant has been the "Special Registration" program,
which requires certain immigrant men from twenty-six countries, all but
one of them Muslim countries, to register with the government and to sub-
mit to interrogation.55 Similarly, at the outset of the war against Iraq, the
Department of Homeland Security announced that people from thirty-three
countries (again, almost all of them Muslim countries) who sought asylum
upon entry to the United States would be subject to mandatory detention,
immigration and have relied upon it in restricting the due process rights of noncitizens. Although
routinely criticized by commentators, the plenary power doctrine retains its fundamental vitality. As
one such critic, Gabriel Chin, has noted:
Plessy, Lockwood, Davis, and other disgraceful cases of that era are not just dead but
dishonored, usually discussed if at all as evidence of a lamentable history of bigotry in
American law. The cases that created the plenary power doctrine, by contrast, not only
continue to be cited but, in the words of one distinguished authority, "said nearly everything
the modem lawyer needs to know about the source and extent of Congress's power to
regulate immigration."
Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation 's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1, 6 (1998) (footnote omitted). See also infra note 81 and
accompanying text. The plenary power doctrine is frequently criticized by immigration scholars. See,
e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary
Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 289, 290 n.5 (listing articles critical of the plenary power
doctrine).
54. See Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The "Plenary
Power" Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L. J. 13, 20-24 (2003) (arguing
that the plenary power cases support a range of otherwise constitutionally suspect post-September 11
immigration enforcement practices).
55. See 8 C.F.R. § 264.1 (2003). Among the information sought in the interrogations were the
following: place of birth; home address and phone number; date of arrival in the United States; height,
weight, hair color, and eye color; financial information; and the addresses, birthdates, and phone
numbers of parents and any "foreign" friends. Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n, Office-by-Office
Summary of How INS is Handling Call-In Special Registration, (Dec. 18, 2002), at
www.aila.org/newsViewer.aspx?bc=273&doclD=9278 (last modified Feb. 20, 2003). Although the
government initially announced that all temporary visitors would be required to register, the program
has not been expanded beyond the twenty-six countries. Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens
From Designated Countries, 68 Fed. Reg. 2,363 (Jan. 16, 2003); 67 Fed. Reg. 77,641 (Dec. 18, 2002);
67 Fed. Reg. 70,525 (Nov. 22, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 66,765 (Nov. 6, 2002); Registration and Monitoring
of Certain Nonimmigrants From Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,032 (Sept. 6, 2002).
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even though asylum applicants from other countries of the world would
not.56
Such racially defined immigration laws and policies, enacted after
September 11, have been complemented by a policy of selective enforce-
ment of pre-existing immigration laws against Arabs, Muslims, and South
Asians.57 For example, in January 2002, the DOJ announced the Alien
Absconder Initiative, purporting to identify and deport 315,000 undocu-
mented people who have ignored court orders to leave the United States. 8
Although theoretically applicable to all immigrants, the government an-
nounced that the program would begin with six thousand immigrants from
Muslim countries despite the fact that such immigrants comprise only a
small percentage of "absconders."59 In some instances, the government has
reprised obscure and previously unenforced immigration laws, and applied
them, seemingly exclusively, against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians.
Chief among these is a requirement that immigrants notify the INS of a
change of address within ten days of moving.6" Despite the fact that INS
prosecution guidelines provide that violation of this requirement should
ordinarily not be a sole basis for removal, it threatens to become exactly
that with regard to Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians.6'
56. See Press Kit, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Operation Liberty Shield (Mar. 18, 2003), at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/pressjrelease/press-release_Ol l5.xml (last visited Apr. 12,
2004) ("Asylum applicants from nations where aI-Qaeda, al-Qaeda sympathizers, and other terrorist
groups are known to have operated will be detained for the duration of their processing period.").
Curiously, the only public document in which this policy was memorialized was this press release.
57. Although the Supreme Court has been hostile to selective enforcement claims, see infra note
325 and accompanying text, I maintain that selective enforcement practices are constitutionally suspect
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
58. ADC REPORT, supra note 9, at 36-37.
59. See Deputy Attorney General Releases Internal Guidance for 'Absconder' Apprehensions, 79
No. 8 Interpreter Releases 261 (2002); Dan Eggan, Deportee Sweep Will Start With Mideast Focus,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al (noting that the operation would focus on immigrants from countries
identified as having an al Qaeda presence, even though the vast majority of absconders are Latin
American); Internal Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, Guidance for
Absconder Apprehension Initiative (Jan. 25, 2002), at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/
abscndr012502mem.pdf; ADC Report, supra note 9, at 36-37 ("[B]y adding the 6,000 presumed
Middle Easterners to the database first, and others among the 300,000 afterwards, the government is
placing a priority on removing a group of absconders based on their presumed ethnicity.").
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2003); see also ADC REPORT, supra note 9, at 135.
61. See Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg.
48,818 (July 26, 2002) (announcing government's intention to enforce the ten-day requirement); War
on Terrorism: Immigration Enforcement Since September 11, 2001: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Sec. and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003)
[hereinafter War on Terrorism] (statement of Laura Murphy, Am. Civil Liberties Union), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/murphy050803.htm; see also 81 INTERPRETER RELEASES 721 (Vol. 81,
n.22, May 28, 2004) (reporting that the FBI may now arrest immigrants for civil as well as criminal
violations under the INA, including failure to file a change of address form). The racially targeted use
of the change of address requirement is exemplified by the case of Thar Abdeljabar, a traveling
Palestinian salesman. Abdeljabar, a lawful permanent resident, was stopped by police in Raleigh, North
Carolina, for driving four miles per hour over the speed limit. The police called the FBI after finding
127520041
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In addition to its own profiling, the government has subscribed to pro-
filing by ordinary citizens as well. Many Arabs, Muslims, and South
Asians were detained after September 11 based on "tips" by neighbors,
coworkers, and complete strangers that particular individuals looked suspi-
cious.62 The government selectively followed up on such tips when Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians were involved,63 thereby endorsing the preju-
dice and profiling of the informants.
The government's racial profiling in immigration enforcement is re-
flected with stunning clarity in INS statistics, which show a dramatic in-
crease in the numbers of immigrants from Muslim countries apprehended
by the INS. Between September 2001 and September 2002, the number of
deportable Pakistanis apprehended increased 228% over the previous
year.64 The number of Saudis increased by 239%, Algerians by 224%,
Egyptians by 83%, and Moroccans by 76%.65 The increase in the number
of immigrants from Muslim countries removed (as opposed to merely ap-
prehended) during this time is similarly dramatic: 129% for Pakistanis,
113% for Saudis, 111% for Algerians, 199% for Egyptians, and 229% for
Moroccans. 66 During this same time, the total number of deportable immi-
grants apprehended decreased by 23%, and the total number of immigrants
cash and a map with circled cities that he used for his work. Abdeljabar was questioned, but not
charged, by the FBI, only to be charged by the INS for failure to file a change of address form.
Although the INS attempted to deport him on this ground, an immigration judge ruled that it could only
remove those noncitizens who intentionally fail to report an address change. Mark Bixler, High
Response to Address Law Swamps INS, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 18, 2002, at F3; War on Terrorism,
supra; see also Haroon Siddiqui, In the Land of Freedom and Liberty Washington is Breaching What
It's Preaching, TORONTO STAR, June 8, 2003, at F I.
62. See Chishti, et. al., supra note 25, at 12; Ashar, supra note 36, at 1190; OIG Report, supra
note 22, at 16-17. In July 2002, the Attorney General announced plans to implement the Terrorist
Information and Prevention System (TIPS). The program would have used people in certain industries,
such as truckers, utility workers, mass transit workers, and postal workers, to voluntarily report
suspicious activity to federal authorities. Immediately criticized across the political spectrum as a
"snitch system" in which American citizens would spy on one another, the program was scaled back
and eventually abandoned. See Adam Clymer, Traces of Terror: Security and Liberty: Worker Corps to
be formed to Report Odd Activity, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at A 18; Edward Epstein, Retiring Armey
Holds Nothing Back, Candor Resonates Across House Aisle, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 16, 2002, at A 1; Frank
James, Bush Scales back Terror Tip Program: Postal and Utility Workers Dropped, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
10, 2002, at B10.
63. CHISHTI, ET AL., supra note 25, at 12.
64. Compare IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2002 INS
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2002), at 180 tbl.39, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/
statistics/ENF2002tables.pdf [hereinafter FY 2002 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK], with
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
(2001), at 10 tbl.58, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/ENF200ltables.pdf
[hereinafter FY 2001 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].
65. Compare FY 2002 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 64, at 180 tbl.39, with FY
2001 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 64, at 10 tbl.58.
66. FY 2002 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 64, at 190 tbl.46.
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removed decreased by 16%.67 Although many variables contribute to the
number of immigrants from a particular country apprehended in a given
year, there is a clear trend in favor of immigration enforcement against
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, even at a time when the total number
of immigrants apprehended and deported has decreased significantly.
Percent Increase in Immigration Apprehensions and
Removals by Country of Origin: September 2001-2002
3 300
m 250150 * Apprehensions
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The purportedly private killings and other bias incidents discussed
earlier are clearly forms of hate violence, but governmental racial profiling
should be understood as such as well. Indeed, physical violence against
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, and racial profiling of these same
communities, are best understood as different facets of the same social,
political, and cultural phenomena. Each is constitutive of the other: we
might view physical hate violence as the end product of racial profiling's
flawed logic, just as racial profiling may be viewed as a form of violence-
whether psychic or physical-flowing from bias.68 Alternatively, post-
September 1 1 hate violence should be understood as a form of racial profil-
ing."9 In either case, our understanding of one enhances our grasp of the
other, and for this reason the analyses of each are largely interchangeable.7"
67. Apprehensions of deportable immigrants from certain other countries decreased dramatically.
For example, the number of deportable Mexicans apprehended decreased by 24%, Cubans by 36%, and
Dominicans by 37%. Compare FY 2002 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 64, at 180 tbl.39,
with FY 2001 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 64, at 10 tbl.58. Removal numbers for
immigrants from these countries also decreased: 23% for Mexicans, 24% for Cubans, and 13% for
Dominicans. Compare FY 2002 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 64, at 190 tbl.46, with FY
2001 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 64, at 27 tbl.65.
68. I address the logic of racial profiling in greater detail in Part II.
69. Leti Volpp adopts this view in her description of post-September I I hate violence as
"extralegal racial profiling." Volpp, supra note 14, at 1580.
70. Muneer Ahmad, Homeland Insecurities: Racial Violence the Day After September II, 72
Soc. TEXT 101, 104 (2002).
2004] 1277
CA LIFORNIA LA W RE VIE W
II.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF "MUSLIM-LOOKING" PEOPLE AND THE "LOGIC"
OF FUNGIBILITY
Both individual acts of hate violence and governmental racial profil-
ing have helped to create a new racial construct: the "Muslim-looking"
person.71 The logic of post-September 11 profiling turns on an equation of
being Muslim with being a terrorist. For the perpetrator of post-September
11 hate violence, the error lies in assuming that because all of the
September 11 terrorists were Arab and Muslim, all Arabs and Muslims
must be terrorists themselves, or terrorist sympathizers. The logic of gov-
ernmental profiling is only slightly more nuanced: (1) because all of the
September 11 terrorists were Arab and Muslim; (2) because most Arabs
are Muslims; and (3) because the terrorists claim religious motivation for
their actions; (4) all Arabs and all Muslims are likely to be terrorists.
Like other instances of racial profiling, this construct relies upon a
reductive equation of certain perceived identity characteristics with spe-
cific, suspect conduct. Under earlier profiling regimes, for example,
African American and Latino appearance has been equated with criminal-
ity,7 2 Latino appearance with illegal border crossing,73 and Asian appear-
ance with treason.74 In each case, the result is to treat all people appearing
to share a certain identity characteristic as fungible with some object-real
or imagined-of suspicion.
Despite its expression in religious terms and its purported concern
with violent activity, the "Muslim-looking" construct is neither religion-
nor conduct-based. Rather, the profile has considerable, if not predominant,
racial content and is preoccupied with phenotype rather than faith or ac-
tion. As with previous regimes of profiling, this one results in gross over-
breadth because of its reliance upon appearance; the regime's ascription of
identity characteristics to its subjects dictates the application of the profile.
The racial dimension of the construct allows it to capture not only Arab
Muslims, but Arab Christians, Muslim non-Arabs (such as Pakistanis or
Indonesians), non-Muslim South Asians (Sikhs, Hindus), and even Latinos
and African Americans, depending on how closely they approach the
71. See Hing, supra note 13, at 443-44 (describing the grouping of "Muslims, Middle Easterners,
and South Asians"); Volpp, supra note 14, at 1576 (describing a new identity category as "persons who
appear 'Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim"').
72. See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Lu-in
Wang, "Suitable Targets"? Parallels and Connections Between "Hate" Crimes and "Driving While
Black, " 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 209, 210 (2001).
73. See Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 121, 159-61 (2001); Johnson, supra note 21.
74. See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee,
47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1694 (2000).
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phenotypic stereotype of the terrorist. 7 "Looking," not "Muslim," is the
operative word in "Muslim-looking."
The profiling effected by hate violence depends upon two different
assumptions of fingibility. The first associates all Muslims with the terror-
ists who perpetrated the September 11 attacks. The second identifies all
"Muslim-looking" people as Muslims. The end result is to view
"Muslim-looking" people as stand-ins for the terrorists themselves. The
"logic" of these twin fungibilities is, of course, devoid of much logic at all
and appears to derive from fear, ignorance, and pre-existing racisms rather
than any rational decisionmaking.76
Governmental profiling is similarly flawed in its logic. 77 One might
argue government profiling is based upon neither religion nor race, but na-
tional origin.78 While the government's targeted immigration enforcement
has relied nominally upon national origin rather than race, 79 the govern-
ment's application of these purportedly national origin-based policies has
ensnared countless individuals who are not citizens of the government's
list of designated countries. In particular, many "Muslim-looking"
Canadians have been caught up in the government's dragnet, a phenome-
non best exemplified by the U.S. government's deportation of Maher Arar,
a Canadian citizen, to Syria."0 The "Muslim-looking" profile may be
75. As Leti Volpp has noted, this newly constituted racial group is in fact a consolidation of
several different racial and ethnic groups. Volpp, supra note 14, at 1576.
76. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 33, at 301-26 (arguing that post-September 11 profiling of
Arabs and Muslims relied upon pre-September 11 constructions of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists);
Lynda Gorov, False Leads Abound Since Disaster, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 1995, at 10; Charles M.
Sennot, After Bombings, America Faces Up to Prejudice, BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 1995, at 1.
77. See generally Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11
World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195 (2003) (arguing that post-September 11 racial profiling is
ineffective because it curtails deeper and more meaningful criminal investigation). But see Stephen J.
Ellmann, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 305, 337, 343 (2003) (arguing
that racial profiling can make a "real contribution" to protecting against terrorism, but not without
profound costs, and endorsing a form of "emergency profiling").
78. See Mariano-Florentino Cu~llar, Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National Origin and Race,
6 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 9, 9 (2003) (noting that profiling on the basis of national origin "may be less
troubling to some than outright racial profiling," and that it may find more support "because it is not an
obvious violation of the law").
79. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Special Registration program
and Operation Liberty Shield).
80. Arar, a naturalized Canadian citizen who left Syria fifteen years earlier, was detained at John
F. Kennedy Airport in New York while in transit from Zurich to Montreal after a family trip to Tunisia.
U.S. immigration officials accused Arar of having terrorist connections, detained and interrogated him,
and ultimately deported him to Syria, seemingly over the objections of the Canadian government. See
Anthony DePalma, Canadian Immigrant Arrested at J.F.K. is Deported to Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2002, at A 14; Daniel J. Wakin, Tempers Flare After U.S. Sends a Canadian Citizen Back to Syria on
Terror Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. I1, 2002, at A9; see also Sheema Khan, An Outrage Against
Canada, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 16, 2002, at A 17 (describing Arar case and collecting stories
of other Canadian citizens caught in the U.S. immigration system after September 11). The situation
became so severe that the Canadian government took the extraordinary step of issuing a travel advisory
for its citizens born in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia who were contemplating travel
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heterogeneous to some degree, featuring racial, religious, and national ori-
gin characteristics, but race, and to a lesser extent religion, predominate
over national origin in frequent and troubling ways.8 Moreover, govern-
mental profiling has relied upon assumptions of fungibility in much the
same way that hate violence after September 11 has.
The pervasiveness of this governmentally constructed profile and its
implications for individuals outside of the Arab, Muslim, and South Asian
communities is exemplified in a recent decision of the Attorney General
regarding the seemingly non-terrorism related issue of Haitian boatpeople
seeking refuge in the United States. 2 The Attorney General reviewed a
decision by his own Board of Immigration Appeals, In re D-J-, upholding
the release on $2500 bond of an eighteen-year-old Haitian man and his
seventeen-year-old brother, both of whom had fled Haiti by boat and re-
quested asylum in the United States upon interdiction by the U.S. Coast
Guard.83 The Attorney General revoked bond and announced a blanket pol-
icy of mandatory detention for all Haitian boatpeople seeking entry to the
United States, based on two national security concerns. First, the Attorney
General argued that releasing the Haitians on bond would encourage more
Haitians to come to the United States, requiring attention from the Coast
Guard and the military, thereby diverting these resources from counterter-
rorism efforts.8 4 Second, noting a national security concern raised by the
prospect of undocumented noncitizens from Haiti being released within the
United States without adequate background checks, the Attorney General
wrote that the State Department has "noticed an increase in third country
to the United States. See Canada Issues U.S. Travel Warning (Oct. 30, 2002), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/l10/30/world/main527560.shtml. After ten months in Syria, Arar
was released and returned to Canada. Arar alleges he was beaten, tortured, and forced to make false
confessions while in Syrian custody and has sued U.S. officials under the Torture Victims' Protection
Act. See Kathleen Harris, Arar Files Suit Against Yanks; Wants To Clear His Name So He Can 'Move
Forward,' TORONTO STAR, Jan. 23, 2004, at 32. Under intense political pressure, the Canadian
government has agreed to a public inquiry into the role of Canadian officials in the arrest and detention
of Arar. See Kathleen Harris, 'Great Day' For Justice; Maher Arar Gets Public Inquiry, TORONTO
STAR, Jan. 29, 2004, at 5. It has also been disclosed that the Ottawa Police Service and the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) were involved in the Arar matter. See Kathleen Harris, New Twist
in Arar Case; Ottawa Cops Admit Playing a Part, TORONTO SUN, Mar. 10, 2004, at 37. Meanwhile,
Arar's wife, Monia Mozigh, now a public figure in Canada due to her efforts to free her husband,
became a candidate for Member of Parliament. See Kathleen Harris, Arar's Wife Wants to Be MPfor
NDP, TORONTO SUN, Mar. 11, 2004, at 38.
81. The government also has an incentive in characterizing its policies as based on national origin
alone, because the plenary power doctrine grants broad authority to discriminate on the basis of
national origin in immigration matters in ways that are constitutionally impermissible outside of the
immigration context. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
82. In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572 (2003).
83. See Susan Benesch, Haitians Trapped by 'War on Terrorism', at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
amnestynow/haiti.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
84. In re D-J-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 578.
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nations (Pakistanis, Palestinians, etc.)85 using Haiti as a staging point for
attempted migration to the United States,"86 thereby necessitating the man-
datory detention of all people fleeing Haiti for the United States.87
The first of these rationales might be understood as an example of the
elasticity of the national security argument in policymaking after
September 11, but the second argument is more profound for its cursory
deployment of the Muslim-terrorist equation. Mere mention of "Pakistanis,
Palestinians, etc.," and parenthetically at that, is sufficient to establish a
terrorist concern regarding the flow of refugees from Haiti with almost no
further analysis or facts. At first glance, this may seem like the kind of na-
tional origin-based policymaking that pervades immigration law, rather
than any more pernicious form of profiling. However, a closer reading
suggests otherwise, for the Administration is not only concerned about
Pakistanis and Palestinians. Rather, Pakistanis and Palestinians represent
some larger class of people, as evident by the "etc." which follows, and
which is not explained anywhere in the opinion."8 One might ask what the
"etc." means. It seems quite clear that it is not intended to include Irish,
Italian, or Guatemalan citizens, just as it seems clear that it is intended to
include Syrian, Indonesian, and Saudi citizens. Although the government's
concern here ostensibly is with its limited capacity to "promptly undertake
an exhaustive factual investigation concerning the status of hundreds of
undocumented aliens,"89 it is expressed explicitly in terms of only two na-
tionalities and metonymically implicates nationals of all Muslim countries.
Thus, in the government's usage, Pakistanis and Palestinians do not repre-
sent third country nationals, but third country Muslims, a point so obvious
that the Administration need not speak its name.
As with other profiling regimes, post-September 1 1 profiling suffers
from gross overbreadth, but unlike other regimes its overbreadth is largely
forgiven.9" Further inquiry into post-September 11 hate violence sheds light
85. There is a grammatical incongruity between the phrase "third country nations" and the
exemplifying parenthetical referring to nationalities ("Pakistanis, Palestinians, etc."). The poor drafting
aside, it seems clear that the concern is for certain third country nationals-that is, individuals who are
neither Haitian nor American.
86. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
87. This policy of mandatory detention currently applies only to Haitians. Apart from the
Administration's trafficking in racial stereotypes discussed in the text above, this policy fits into a
pattern of exceptionalism in U.S. refugee policy with regard to Haiti that has been criticized as racially
motivated. See, e.g., Joyce A. Hughes & Linda R. Crane, Haitians: Seeking Refuge in the United States,
7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747 (1993).
88. Nor is the claim of such use of Haiti as a staging ground substantiated beyond the Attorney
General's mention of this claim by the State Department.
89. In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 580.
90. Further evidence of this overbreadth is provided by the decision to restrict airport security
screening jobs to U.S. citizens. The presumption here is that all noncitizens are a terrorist threat. See
Gebin v. Mineta, 239 F. Supp. 2d 967 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (challenging citizenship requirement of the
Aviation Transportation and Security Act on equal protection and due process grounds), vacated 1y 328
20041
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on why the public has tolerated such extensive racial violence from
"private" and "public" actors alike.
III.
UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS OF POST-SEPTEMBER 11 HATE VIOLENCE
Hate violence against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians did not be-
gin with the September 11 attacks, nor is such violence or its racializing
effect a new phenomenon. Rather, they fit into multiple, larger histories of
anti-immigrant discrimination and racial violence in the United States. In
this Section, I note briefly pre-September 11 racialization of Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians, and the parallels between post-September 11
violence and the historical racialization of Asian Americans. I then turn to
consider a typology for understanding hate violence that has emerged in
recent years, and how post-September 11 violence has been understood as
categorically different from the paradigmatic hate crime.
Hate violence against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians is a recurrent
rather than a new phenomenon. During the first Gulf War in 1991, for ex-
ample, Iraqi Americans, Arab Americans, and Muslims of many nationali-
ties experienced hate violence.9' More tellingly, in the immediate aftermath
of the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building, "experts"
concluded that the bombing bore the "hallmarks" of Middle Eastern terror-
ism and suspicion focused on Arabs and Muslims.9 As a result, 220 inci-
dents of hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims were reported nationwide
and several Arab and Muslim men were detained before Timgthy
McVeigh, a white man, was identified as the bomber.93 These incidents
reflect the existence of a reflexive association of terrorism with Arabs and
Muslims that has developed over a course of decades.94
F. 3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2003). The Aviation Transportation and Security Act has since been amended to
make U.S. nationals as well as U.S. citizens eligible for the screening positions. Homeland Security Act
of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
91. See, e.g., Peter Y. Hong, Leaders in Southland Say Attacks on their People and Businesses
Increased after the 1991 Gulf War and Bombings in New York City and Oklahoma City, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1998, at B3; David L. Shutz, W. Springfield Police Faulted Over Handling of Attack at Mosque,
BOSTON GLobe, Apr. 21, 1992, at 20 (quoting local citizen claiming that after the Gulf War, racial slurs
and vandalism have increased, in part due to the media's stereotype of Muslims as terrorists). This
violence repeated during the second Gulf War. David Reyes, Reports ofAnti-Arab Bias Up in '01, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at B7.
92. See Sam Vincent Meddis, 12 kids among 31 dead in Oklahoma bombing; Oklahoma learns
'no place is safe,' USA TODAY, Apr. 20, 1995, at AI (quoting former FBI and CIA director William
Webster as saying that the Oklahoma City bombing bears "hallmarks" of Middle Eastern terrorism).
93. See Laurie Goodstein, Report Cites Harassment of Muslims; Many Cases Followed
Oklahoma City Bombing, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1996, at A3 (reporting a finding by the Council on
American-Islamic Relations that 216 of the 296 reported anti-Muslim bias crimes in 1996 occurred in
the week following the Oklahoma City Bombing).
94. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Seige: Japanese American Redress and the
"Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists", 8 ASIAN L. J. 1, 12 (2001) (describing how media
representations, anti-terrorism legislation, and the use of indefinite detention and secret evidence prior
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In the years preceding September 11, South Asians increasingly had
become the targets of hate crimes as well.95 As Rosemary George has
noted, many South Asians in the United States have long denied that they
possess a racial identity, choosing instead cultural modes of self-
identification.96 Similarly, Vijay Prashad has argued that South Asians in
the United States have accepted a racial (and racist) accommodation by
which they deny their racial identity in exchange for class mobility.97
While not specifically associated with terrorism in the way that Arabs and
Muslims have been, in recent years South Asians nonetheless have become
identified as a distinct and foreign racial group, the efforts of some South
Asians to avoid such a racialized fate notwithstanding. This has been espe-
cially true in light of the rapid growth of South Asian communities in the
past two decades.98 The growing visibility of South Asians in the United
States may have led to increased hate violence, which in turn has played an
important role in infusing South Asian American identity with racial
to September II had already raced Arab Americans and Muslims as terrorists); Akram & Johnson,
supra note 33, at 301-27 (discussing evolution of the racialized association of Arabs and Muslims with
terrorists).
95. The 1998 and 1999 National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium annual audits on
anti-Asian violence reported that South Asians comprised the Asian Pacific American ethnic group
with the highest numbers of reported violent incidents. Fifty-two incidents against South Asians were
reported in 1999 and forty-two in 1998. See IYER, supra note 12, at 13 (citing NAT'L ASIAN PAC. AM.
LEGAL CONSORTIUM ET AL., CHALLENGING THE INVISIBILITY OF HATE: 1999 AUDIT OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS; NAT'L ASIAN PAC. AM. LEGAL CONSORTIUM ET AL., THE NEED
FOR INCREASED COMMITMENT TO REPORTING AND COMMUNITY EDUCATION: 1998 AUDIT OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS). In the late 1980s, South Asians in New Jersey and
New York were victims of a spate of hate crimes by vigilante groups that called themselves the
"dotbusters", so named after the bindi worn by many Hindu women. See Deborah N. Misir, The
Murder of Navroze Mody: Race, Violence, and the Search for Order, 22 AMERASIA J., Summer 1996, at
55(1996).
96. Rosemary Marangoly George, "From Expatriate Aristocrat to Immigrant Nobody ": South
Asian Racial Strategies in the Southern Californian Context, 6 DIASPORA 31, 31 (1997).
97. VIJAY PRASHAD, THE KARMA OF BROWN FOLK 94 (2000).
98. Immigrants from South Asia came to the United States in significant numbers starting as
early as the mid-nineteenth century, when primarily Punjabi farmers settled in California's Central
Valley. KAREN ISAKSEN LEONARD, THE SOUTH ASIAN AMERICANS 39 (Ronald Bayor ed., 1997). The
creation of the Asiatic Barred Zone, however, prohibited immigration of natives or descendants of
natives of several continental Asian countries, including the Asian subcontinent, halting South Asian
immigration early on. See Chin, supra note 53, at 14 (citing Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §3, 39 Stat.
874, 876). Congress had begun limiting immigration from China in 1882 and from Japan in 1907-08.
Chin, supra note 53, at 13-14. Anti-Asian immigration restrictions were only fully lifted with the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, at which time large numbers of South Asians begin to
immigrate to the United States again. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). In recent years, the
South Asian community has grown dramatically; the Indian population alone increased 105.9% from
1990 to 2000. See Asian Am. Fed'n Census Info. Ctr., Census 2000: Detailed Asian Groups in the
United States (2000), at http://www.aafny.org/cic/dl/unitedstates.pdf (last visited Sept. I, 2004). (This
data excludes figures for Bhutanese, Maldivians, and Nepalese.) There are approximately 1.9 million
South Asians in the United States today. JESSICA S. BARNES & CLAUDETTE E. BENNETT, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, THE ASIAN POPULATION: 2000, at 9 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2002pubs/c2kbr0 I - I 6.pdf.
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content even prior to September 11. 9' These histories demonstrate that the
hatred manifest in post-September 11 violence was not solely a product of
September 11. Rather, there is a genealogy of racism toward Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians that predates the terrorist attacks and that per-
petrators of post-September 11 violence tapped into after September 11.
Racial violence against Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities
after September 11 also finds precedent in the histories of episodic vio-
lence against other immigrant communities, particularly Asian Americans.
For example, Bill Ong Hing drawn parallels between post-September 11
violence and episodes of racial violence against Chinese, Korean, and
Filipino immigrant laborers in late 19th and early 20th century
California. 00 Moreover, the post-September 11 experience of "Muslim-
looking" people bears a striking resemblance to the racialization of
Japanese-Americans during World War 1I, and recalls the persistent tropes
of disloyalty and perpetual foreignness that have long been associated with
Asian Americans.10' As Natsu Saito has argued persuasively, the intern-
ment of Japanese Americans was not merely "an unfortunate by-product of
'racial prejudice and wartime hysteria"' with its genesis in the immediate
aftermath of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, as the traditional narrative pro-
vides,' nor was it "an aberration, an instance in which our nation
temporarily strayed from its basic commitment to due process and equal
protection."'0 o3 Rather, when viewed within the context of Asian American
history, internment was only the latest in a long lineage of racial prejudice
toward Asian Americans. Saito argues:
99. See Misir, supra note 95, at 56 (arguing that hate violence against Indians was the result of
increasing racialization and the Indian community's increasing visibility); Janet Dang, Anti-Asian Hate
Crimes on the Rise, ASIANWEEK, Jan. 12-18, 2000, at http://www.asianweek.com/2001_01l12/
newsl antiasiancrimerising.html (citing National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium staff
member Aryani Ong for the proposition that increases in hate violence toward South Asians could be
due to growth in the South Asian population, particularly on the East Coast).
100. Hing writes:
In the mid-1800s, Chinese miners were targets of wanton abuse. An 1862 California
legislative committee developed a list of eighty-eight Chinese miners who were murdered in
what the committee labeled "a wholesale system of wrong and outrage practiced upon the
Chinese population of this state, which would disgrace the most barbarous nation upon
earth." In the 1870s, the homes of many Chinese living in California's Sacramento Valley
were burned down. In 1885, six hundred unarmed Chinese coal miners were fired upon in
Rock Springs, Wyoming; twenty-eight were killed and fifteen wounded. In 1913, fifteen
Korean fruit pickers in Riverside County, California, were threatened by a crowd that forced
them to leave town. Similarly, in a San Joaquin County, California town in 1921, fifty-eight
Japanese laborers were rounded up by armed men and forced out of town. In 1930, a mob of
four hundred attacked the Northern Monterey Filipino Club near Watsonville, California,
killing one Filipino and injuring dozens more.
Hing, supra note 13, at 446 (internal citations omitted).
101. See infra notes 237-46 and accompanying text.
102. Saito, supra note 94, at 4 (footnote omitted).
103. Id. at 8-9.
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One need only look at the social, political, economic, and legal
history of Asian Americans in the United States, from the
enforcement of the 1790 Naturalization Act's limitation of
citizenship to 'free white persons,' to the exploitation of Chinese
labor in the mines and building of the railroads, to lynchings and
Jim Crow laws, to Chinese exclusion in the 1880s and the
exclusion of the Japanese in the early 1900s, to the alien land laws,
and to the National Origins Act of 1924, to see that the military
orders to exclude and then imprison 'all persons of Japanese
ancestry, both alien and non-alien' were really a logical extension
of all that had come before.'0 4
Arguing that internment was aberrant only in degree, Saito insists upon a
historicized understanding of the Japanese-American experience as charac-
teristic of a long-established presumption of Asian American
foreignness.'°5
Writing just prior to the terrorist attacks, Saito argued presciently that
pre-September 11 racialization of Arabs and Muslims in the United States
mapped onto the presumption of disloyalty and foreignness so familiar to
Asian Americans, and she suggested the political possibility of internment
of Arab Americans.0 6 Although internment has not come to pass, Saito
was accurate in her prediction of expanded racial violence against Arabs
and Muslims. 7 Her analysis counsels that the post-September 11 racializa-
tion of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians not be viewed as either aberra-
tional in the context of American immigrant history, or as a product of
September 11 alone. Rather, it should be understood as yet another mani-
festation of entrenched anti-immigrant discrimination, one which began
long before the terrorist attacks.
While part of a historical tapestry of anti-immigrant racial violence,
the post-September 11 experience of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians
also fits into another framework of violence against marginalized groups
which, since the 1980s, has been described factually and legally as hate
crime.'08 Understood as criminal acts motivated by animus toward
104. Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted).
105. Id. at 9.
106. "Just as Asian Americans have been 'raced' as foreign, and from there as presumptively
disloyal, Arab Americans and Muslims have been 'raced' as 'terrorists': foreign, disloyal, and
imminently threatening." Id. at 12 (footnotes omitted).
107. As Saito notes, "we need not postulate the wholesale internment of Arab Americans to see
how many of the issues faced today by Arab Americans parallel those Asian Americans have
encountered." Id,
108. The term "hate crime" was introduced by United States Representatives John Conyers,
Barbara Kennelly, and Mario Biaggi, who in 1985 co-sponsored the bill that became the Hate Crime
Statistics Act. JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY
POLITICS 4 (1998). The legal category to which "hate crime" refers in this legislation is based upon
model "ethnic intimidation" legislation drafted in 1981 by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.
Id.
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individuals because of their race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or
gender, among other characteristics," 9 hate crimes could encompass the
whole history of racial violence".0 in the United States, from slavery to the
extermination of Native Americans,"' to lynchings of African
Americans,12 to mob violence against Asian laborers in California."3
Despite this seeming expansiveness, an anti-hate crimes movement, which
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s,"4 has endowed the term "hate crime"
with particular meaning, thereby shaping popular understanding of con-
temporary racial violence as a different, if not new, manifestation of racism
in the United States.
As the anti-hate crime movement has developed, media, activists, and
politicians have helped to establish a paradigmatic hate crime in legal
thought and in the public imagination. Two hate crimes in recent mem-
ory-the killings of James Byrd and Matthew Shepard, both in 1998-
have come to epitomize a broadly shared conception of hate violence.
Those cases serve as a useful point of comparison for post-September 11
hate violence, for this more recent hate violence bears much in common
with them. And yet, despite these similarities, the public has understood
the post-September 11 hate violence in markedly different terms.
On June 7, 1998, James Byrd, an African American man from Jasper,
Texas, was chained to the back of a pick-up truck and dragged to death by
three white men with ties to white supremacist groups." 5 Before Byrd died,
the three white men dismembered and finally decapitated him. Prior to kill-
ing Byrd, one of his tormentors reportedly stated that he was "fixin' to
scare the s[hit] out of this n[igger]," and that he was "going to start The
Turner Diaries early.""' 6 The gruesome murder attracted national attention
109. See Terry A. Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564, 564 (1998) (defining hate crime as "acts of violence motivated by animus
against persons and groups because of race, ethnicity, religion, national origin or immigration status,
gender, sexual orientation, disability (including, for example, HIV status), and age"); see also JACOBS
& POTTER, supra note 108, at I I (describing hate crime as "not really about hate," but instead as
concerning "criminal conduct motivated by prejudice").
110. Maroney, supra note 109 at 565 (noting that the hate crime category encompasses a broad
array of historical practices).
Il1. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 108, at 59 (pointing to history of racial violence by
European settlers toward Native Americans, to refute the claim of anti-hate crime movement that the
country is experiencing unprecedented levels of racial violence); Maroney, supra note 109, at 565-66
(citing JACOBS & POTTER).
112. For a discussion of the relationship of lynching to the contemporary conception of hate crime,
see infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
114. For a concise description of the anti-hate crime movement, see Maroney, supra note 109 at
566-67 (describing the emergence of an anti-hate crime social movement in the 1980s and 1990s as a
product of converging interests among civil rights and victims' rights movements).
115. Richard Stewart, Trio Charged in Jasper Slaying, Hous. CHRON., June 10, 1998, at Al,
available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/special/asper/accused/228324.
116. Id. (expletives deleted in original).
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and widespread condemnation, and it mobilized support for strengthening
Texas's hate crime statute and for passing federal hate crime legislation."
17
Four months later, twenty-two-year-old Matthew Shepard, an openly
gay man in Laramie, Wyoming, was kidnapped, beaten, burned, and then
tied to a fence and left to die by three young men who were later overheard
making anti-gay remarks." 8 Like the Byrd killing, this case galvanized not
only the gay community,"9 but mainstream opposition to violence against
gays and lesbians as well. 2° The killing was roundly condemned and added
further impetus to the drive for hate crime legislation at both the state and
federal levels.''
The coincidence of the two brutal killings within a matter of months
rendered Byrd and Shepard national symbols of the anti-hate violence
movement. President Clinton regularly invoked Byrd's and Shepard's
names and memories in advocating passage of federal hate crime legisla-
tion,'22 and the media committed extensive coverage to the killings, the
trials and sentencings of their perpetrators, as well as the struggles of
Jasper, Texas, Laramie, Wyoming, and the nation to come to terms with
such violence.'23 The Byrd and Shepard killings provoked a sustained
117. See Rick Lyman, Hate Laws Don't Matter, Except When They Do, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1998, at D6. The enhanced hate crime legislation introduced in Texas in 1999 was entitled the James
Byrd, Jr. Act. See Robert Mayer, Senate OKs Hate Crime Bill, DAILY TEXAN, May 8, 2001, at
http://tspweb02.tsp.utexas.edu/webarchive/05-08-O1/.
118. See James Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at Al
(reporting that Shepard's killers were overheard making anti-gay remarks.) The killers had posed as
gay men and lured Shepard out of a bar and into their pick-up truck. Id.
119. See Michael Cooper, Killing Shakes Complacency of the Gay Rights Movement, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 1998, at A5.
120. Speaking on the Senate floor in support of federal hate crime legislation in 2000, Republican
Senator Gordon Smith stated, "When James Byrd Jr. was dragged to death on a dusty Texas road,
something happened to me. I was horrified beyond my ability to express it.... When Matthew Shepard
was beaten to death on a Wyoming prairie, left on a fence to die, something happened to me." Gordon
continued, "What I'm saying to fellow Christians everywhere is that it's time to say to the gay
community, I do not agree with you on everything, but I can help you." Susan Milligan, Senate to Vote
on 'Hate Crimes,' BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 2000, at A3.
121. Lyman, supra note 117.
122. See, e.g., Charles Babington, Clinton Urges Congress to Toughen Laws on Hate Crimes,
WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1999, at AI I (quoting President Clinton as saying, "Hundreds of Americans, like
young Matthew Shepard in Wyoming or James Byrd in Texas, have been killed or injured simply
because of who they are-because of their race, their faith, because they're gay .... And I think this is
important for America and important for our leadership at home and around the world.").
123. See generally Barb Berggoetz, Gay Man's Killing Got More Coverage; Stats Show Blacks
More Likely to be Victims, Researcher Says, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 16, 2004, at 7B (discussing
researcher's finding that there were approximately fifteen hundred newspaper and television stories
covering the Shepard killing, and approximately one hundred on the Byrd killing); Chris Bull, All Eyes
Were Watching, ADVOCATE, Nov. 24, 1998, at http://www.advocate.com/html/stories/0098/media.asp
(stating that "[p]erhaps no previous case of antigay violence has so galvanized public sympathy for the
plight of gay men and lesbians in America" and that coverage of the Shepard killing "was certainly
greater than the vast majority of bias-related murders") (internal quotation omitted). Notably, many of
the stories about the Shepard killing sought to connect his murder with the slaying of Byrd. See id.
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
national discussion on racism, bigotry, and homophobia.' 24 The condemna-
tion of the Byrd and Shepard killings was vociferous, governmental re-
sponses were significant, and public attitudes toward hate violence were
transformed.
The Byrd and Shepard killings closely fit a prototype of hate crime
that has developed in the past two decades.1 25 In the prototypical hate
crime, the perpetrator and victim are strangers; the perpetrator is provoked
not because of something the victim has done, but because the perpetrator
views the victim as fungible with a racial or social group that the perpetra-
tor hates; the crime evinces the perpetrator's hostility toward the particular
group as the perpetrator often makes derogatory comments about the vic-
tim's racial or social group before, during, or after the attack; and the crime
features extreme, gratuitous violence. 2
6
In addition to this prototype of a hate crime, Lu-in Wang has identi-
fied three assumptions that define the prototypical hate crime perpetrator.
127
First, the perpetrator's bias toward a particular racial or social group is un-
derstood to be personal. 128 Second, that bias is understood to be deviant and
irrational; "it is abhorrent and aberrant, and it makes no logical sense. '"129
Finally, the perpetrator's bias is so irrational that animus motivates him to
commit a crime for the sole purpose of inflicting harm on a member of the
target group. 30
As Wang has argued, political, legal, media, and public attention to
hate violence has depended upon this construction of hate crime and its
perpetrators as extreme, deviant, and illogical.' 3' Indeed, such a construc-
tion permits the "viewer" of hate violence to distance herself from the per-
petrator and the crime. By branding the actions of a hate crime perpetrator
124. See generally Rick Bragg, Unfathomable Crime, Unlikely Figure, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998,
at Al (describing the Byrd murder as "a crime so cruel it sickened people across the country");
Charisse Jones, Gay Student's Brutal Death Stokes Hate Crime Debate, USA TODAY, Oct. 13, 1998, at
AI (citing the deaths as "spur[ring] the nation to examine issues of tolerance and bigotry"); Sheba R.
Wheeler, DU Hosts Trio's Push for Tolerance, DENVER POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at B5 (citing Denver
University's continued campaign to raise awareness about racism and homophobia by showing a
documentary about the Byrd and Shepard murders).
125. See Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 799, 801 (1999); Lu-in
Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate ": Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related
Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 48-56 (1997) [hereinafter Wang, Transforming Power of "Hate "']. Wang
argues that these prototypes result in an oversimplified understanding of hate crimes and hate crime
perpetrators, and that a more nuanced understanding of each would improve legal and social efforts to
address the harms of hate crimes. I rely upon Wang's work here for the more limited purpose of
explicating a paradigmatic understanding of hate crimes and hate crime perpetrators that has taken hold
in the legal and popular imaginations.
126. Wang, Transforming Power of "Hate, " supra note 125, at 49-50.
127. Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," supra note 125, at 815-16.
128. Id. at 817-21.
129. Id. at 821-24.
130. Id. at 825-30.
131. Wang, Transforming Power of "Hate, "supra note 125, at 49.
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as deviant, the viewer implicitly positions herself on the side of normalcy,
untainted by the deviance that, by this account, motivates the perpetrator.
As Wang has noted, a "[h]ate crime is often viewed as an extreme or iso-
lated phenomenon that involves conduct that is dramatic and aberrant and
is perpetrated by deviant, rage-filled individuals who are 'out of touch'
with the rest of society.' 3 2 Thus, the construction of this prototype of hate
violence enables the full moral condemnation of the perpetrators and the
crimes because it involves no self-condemnation in the process.
One might question whether the Byrd and Shepard killings reflect a
new paradigm of hate violence, or merely renew an old one. Specifically,
the lynching of African Americans in the aftermath of the Civil War pos-
sesses its own paradigmatic status.'33 Indeed, lynching has been described
as "the archetypal 'hate' crime.., the exemplar to which each new inci-
dent of bias-motivated violence evokes inevitable comparison. ' "14
Moreover, the Byrd and Shepard killings have been described as modern-
day lynchings.'35 Such comparisons are not without basis, as lynching es-
tablished the hallmarks of contemporary hate crime: it clearly involved
violence enacted out of racial bias, 3 6 the violence was designed not only to
punish an individual, but to terrorize entire black communities,'37 and its
violence was frequently gruesome.' Despite these fundamental similari-
ties, important distinctions exist. In particular, unlike the contemporary
hate crime, in which the perpetrator's bias is presumed to be aberrant,
lynchings depended upon and received the imprimatur of rationality and
normalcy offered in the form of mainstream, white southern approval of
the practice. The racial code of white supremacy that lynching enforced
was not outside the mainstream of white southerners, it was the main-
stream, as reflected by the fact that lynchings were almost always carried
132. Wang, supra note 72, at 212.
133. Used initially to punish suspected criminals and Tories during the American Revolution, after
the Civil War lynching emerged as a ritualized form of mob violence enacted by whites against African
Americans as "a means to intimidate, degrade, and control black people throughout the southern and
border states .... ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950,
at 3 (1980); but see W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND
VIRGINIA, 1880-1930, at 19 (1993) (arguing that descriptions of lynching as "a simple ritualistic
affirmation of white unity" obscure the heterogeneity of white supremacist strategies and methods
reflected in various lynching practices). There were 4,743 recorded lynchings between 1882 and 1968,
of which 72.7% of victims were African American. ZANGRANDO, supra at 4.
134. Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," supra note 125, at 831.
135. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Lynching, 21 LAW &
INEQ. J. 263, 264 (2003); see also Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," supra note 125, at 831
(describing the Byrd killing as a lynching).
136. In addition to the racial animus inherent to lynching, historians have identified instrumental
purposes served by the practice including the maintenance of white control over land, labor, and
politics. See Wang, The Complexities of "Hate, " supra note 125, at 836-867.
137. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 133, at 18-19.
138. Ifill, supra note 135, at 282-83 (describing torture, mutilation, and dismemberment of
lynching victims).
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out by mobs, 13 9 were frequently attended by hundreds, if not thousands of
spectators, 140 and often occurred with the complicity of law enforcement
officials. 141 In sharp contrast to lynchings, in their paradigmatic form con-
temporary hate crimes depend upon an ascription of aberrance to the crime
and its perpetrator, and a condemnation of both by the community.
The Byrd and Shepard killings were assimilated into and simultane-
ously helped to popularize these paradigms of hate crime and hate crime
perpetrators. Consistent with the paradigmatic hate crime, the perpetrators
were understood as virtual strangers to their victims, 142 and the perpetrators
were understood to have killed their victims out of a bias toward the social
groups to which each victim belonged-African Americans and gays, re-
spectively. The perpetrators of each crime were reported to have made de-
rogatory remarks just before or just after the killings.14 1 Moreover, Byrd's
dismemberment and decapitation and Shepard's burning and being tied to a
fence to die both demonstrate extreme, gratuitous violence.
Consistent with the paradigm of hate crime perpetrators, Byrd's and
Shepard's killers were characterized as acting out of personal bias, rather
than out of broadly held societal beliefs.'44 This has the effect of localizing
the racism and homophobia of Byrd's and Shepard's killers, and ignores
the role that less extreme practices of racism and homophobia that perme-
ate society may have played in reinforcing the perpetrator's prejudices. 45
Thus, defining the perpetrators' bias as personal enables both a denial and
a condemnation of racism and homophobia generally.
139. BRUNDAGE, supra note 133, at 18-19; Ifill, supra note 135, at 280-81.
140. 1fill, supra note 135, at 285.
141. BRUNDAGE, supra note 133, at 18; lfill, supra note 135, at 281.
142. They were not, in fact, total strangers: Shepard had met his killers in a bar, and one of Byrd's
killers claimed to have seen him around town. See Brooke, supra note 118, at A 1; Stewart, supra note
115, at Al.
143. See supra notes 116 and 118 and accompanying text.
144. Media and public officials' descriptions of the killers attempted to separate the killers' beliefs
from society's. For example, an article in the Houston Chronicle reporting on the filing of charges
against Byrd's killers describes the perpetrators as "three young men with a fetish for white
supremacy." Stewart, supra note 115, at Al (emphasis added). The language of "fetish" denotes white
supremacy as abnormal and deviant, and implicitly casts the "normal" people of mainstream society, in
Texas and elsewhere, as wholly free of racism. The Chronicle story later notes that Byrd's killers "may
have become enamoured with the Aryan Nation and the Ku Klux Klan," thereby equating white
supremacy with membership in extremist organizations, and eliding the multiple expressions of white
supremacy such as housing and employment discrimination, racial profiling, and racially disparate
criminal prosecution and sentencing. Id. The story also quotes Sheriff Billy Rowles as stating, "We
have no organized KKK or Aryan Brotherhood groups here in Jasper Country," an obvious attempt to
characterize the racism of Byrd's killing as foreign to the people and culture of the place in which it
occurred. See id. The Chronicle reports that Rowles's claim "prompted whoops and catcalls" from
African American residents of Jasper County. Id.
145. See Wang, The Complexities of "Hate, " supra note 125, at 817 (arguing that the prototype of
hate crime perpetrators obscures the fact that "the perpetrators' bias is socially reinforced, and not
simply personal").
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The second assumption regarding the prototypical hate crime perpe-
trator-that his bias is deviant and irrational-also holds true in the popu-
lar understanding of the Byrd and Shepard killings. The deviance of Byrd's
killers was a particularly prominent feature in legal and popular accounts
of the killing. 46 State prison officials said that at least two of the killers
were members of the Ku Klux Klan and that they bore white supremacist
tattoos on their bodies. 4' The deviance of these killers was so extreme that
members of a local chapter of the KKK in Texas held a rally to distance
themselves from the killers of Byrd.'4 8 Thus, the bias of the perpetrators
was so aberrant that it was deemed irrational, illogical, and beyond com-
prehension. 49 Once again, the construction of the perpetrators' biases as
aberrant and illogical disavows these biases from the mainstream.
Moreover, implicit in the robustness of the condemnation of these killings
is a rejection of the bias toward African Americans and gays that the
crimes are understood to express, even as less visible and less graphic
structural discrimination against African Americans and gays persists. 5o
Finally, the popular understanding of the Byrd and Shepard killings
constructed the perpetrators as killing their victims for the purpose of in-
flicting harm not merely on the victims themselves, but also on the racial
and social groups to which they belonged. This assumption rests upon a
conception of hate crime as communicative of violence to entire communi-
ties, rather than targeted only at individual victims. The prototype demands
not only that such violence be communicated, but that such communication
be the sole intention of the perpetrator.' 5 ' This leaves no room for mixed or
146. See Statement of the Anti-Defamation League on Bias-Motivated Crime & H.R. 1082-The
Hate Crimes Prevention Act, August 4, 1999, 21 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 53, 53 (2000) (describing
the murders of Shepard and Byrd as "particularly ... depraved"); Texas Atrocity Raises Questions for
All Americans, Editorial, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at B8 [hereinafter Texas Atrocity Raises
Questions] (describing the murder of Byrd as "an act of barbarism, a crime that should be
incomprehensible").
147. Bragg, supra note 124.
148. Id.
149. See Lyman, supra note 117, at D6 (describing Shepard's killing as "utterly senseless"); Texas
Atrocity Raises Questions, supra note 146, at B8.
150. By condemning the most extreme forms of racism and homophobia, both the government and
the public can avoid engagement with and even disclaim the pervasiveness of other forms of such
discrimination. See Maroney, supra note 109, at 585 (arguing that supporting hate crime legislation
"allows government authorities to condemn the most extreme manifestations of prejudice without
committing to eradication of lesser, more pervasive forms"); Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," supra
note 125, at 823 (citing Maroney). For a discussion of how the government's prosecutions of post-
September II perpetrators obscure and normalize its own racism, see infra note 304 and accompanying
text.
151. As Wang notes, this demand is at odds with many hate crime laws, which require only that
the defendant's bias motivation be "'substantial' or 'significant."' Wang, The Complexities of "Hate,"
supra note 125, at 825. Moreover, it ignores substantial social science research which suggests that
"when the victim and target group perceive that the victim was selected on the basis of social group
status, they experience the crime as they would a 'hate' crime," regardless of the perpetrator's actual
2004]
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ulterior motives. The fullness of the condemnation of hate crimes depends
upon these crimes being motivated only by a desire to do harm to particular
racial and social groups.
On first inspection, the post-September 11 violence against Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians, and the killings in particular, bear important
resemblances to the Byrd and Shepard killings. For example, Balbir Singh
Sodhi, a fifty-two-year-old Sikh gas station operator in Mesa, Arizona, was
shot to death on September 15, 2001, four days after the terrorist attacks. 15 2
Before going to Sodhi's gas station and shooting him while Sodhi was
planting flowers outside of the station, his killer, Frank Roque, was over-
heard ranting at a bar ranting that he wanted to kill "ragheads."' 53 (Roque
subsequently shot a Lebanese man at another service station, and fired
shots into the house of an Afghan family. 54) Sodhi was with three Mexican
men when Roque approached, but only Sodhi, clad in a traditional Sikh
turban, was shot.'55 The murder of Vasudev Patel is strikingly similar. Patel
operated a gas station in Mesquite, Texas.'56 On the morning of October 4,
2001, Mark Anthony Stroman, an avowed white supremacist, entered the
gas station, stated "God Bless America," and shot Patel in the chest.157 On
the day of his arrest, Stroman had planned to visit a Dallas mosque. "I was
going to go in shooting Arabs," he said.'58 In the days immediately follow-
ing September 11, Stroman had already killed a Pakistani store clerk,
Waqar Hasan, and blinded a Bangladeshi clerk, Rais Bhuiyan, in separate
shootings before killing Patel.'59 In both the Sodhi and the Patel killings,
the perpetrators were strangers to their victims, appeared to have selected
their victims because of the victims' perceived membership in a particular
racial or social group, communicated the racial motivation of their crimes
through the utterance of derogatory remarks, and exercised gratuitous vio-
lence against them, and seemingly intended to communicate a message of
antipathy to the racial and religious communities from which they hailed
(or from which they were believed to hail). Although the Sodhi and Patel
killings lacked the gruesomeness of the Byrd and Shepard killings-they
were assassinations rather than spectacles of violence-by all other meas-
ures, the Sodhi and Patel killings were prototypical hate crimes.
intent. Id. at 829-30; Wang, Transforming Power of "Hate," supra note 125, at 112-24 (describing
social science research).
152. Pierre, supra note 10, at Al.
153. Id.
154. Laurie Goodstein & Tamar Lewin, Victims of Mistaken Identity, Sikhs Pay a Price for
Turbans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at Al.
155. Id.
156. Pierre, supra note 10, at A 10.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.; Tim Wyatt, Killer of Gas Clerk Gets Death Penalty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 5,
2002, at A27.
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As individual crimes, these cases are being prosecuted fully; both
Roque and Stroman have been convicted and sentenced to death for the
murders they committed. 160 However, these cases, and the thousands of
other incidents of hate violence against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians
have failed to capture the national attention in the way that the Byrd and
Shepard killings did.' 61 While government leaders condemned the post-
September 11 hate violence, 62 and some sympathy was expressed for its
victims, the condemnations and the sympathy differed in extent, if not in
kind, from that expressed for the victims of previous hate crimes. The pub-
lic has not memorialized the victims 63 and has not demanded legislative
reform of the hate crime laws."6 The victims of post-September 11 vio-
lence have not become symbols of something larger. Rather, they have
been largely forgotten. For example, the widow of Waqar Hasan, rather
than receiving the sympathy of the nation for her loss, now faces deporta-
tion. 65 Similarly, those subjected to post-September I l hate violence, and
160. See Man Sentenced to Death for 9/11 Revenge Killing, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at A12
(stating Mark Stroman was sentenced to death for "rage" shooting); Suspect in Sikh's Killing will Face
Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, at AI0 (reporting Frank Roque's sentence).
161. While the same could be said of most violent crimes, my interest is in why, within the context
of hate crime, some cases capture and sustain public attention and others do not.
162. See Richard A. Serrano, Ashcroft Denies Wide Detainee Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at
A4 (reporting that Attorney General John Ashcroft met with leaders of Arab, Muslim, and Sikh
communities, pledging to press hate crime prosecutions and stating "such attacks are un-American and
unlawful"); see also Bush Urges Respect Toward US Muslims, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14, 2001, at A26
(quoting Bush as stating, "[W]e must be mindful that as we seek to win the war, that we treat Arab-
Americans and Muslims with the respect they deserve .... We should not hold one who is a Muslim
responsible for an act of terror."); Alfredo Corchado, President Denounces Anti-Muslim Behavior: 350
Complaints Reported Nationwide Since Tuesday's Attacks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 2001,
at A 13 (quoting Bush as saying, "The face of terror is not the true face of Islam.... In our anger and
emotion, our fellow Americans must treat each other with respect."); Radio Messages on Tolerance,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at A27 (quoting Ashcroft's public service announcement in which he
stated, "We must not target Arab-Americans, American Muslims or Sikhs.").
163. One notable exception to this general neglect was the "Balbir Singh Sodhi Embrace Diversity
Memorial Event," hosted by the Sodhi family and the local Sikh community on September 4, 2002, in
Mesa, Arizona. See Stephanie A. Miller, Memorial for Mesa Man Slain in 9/11 Backlash Draws 500,
ARIz. REPUB., Sept. 15, 2002, at B3 (quoting an organizer as saying, "We're trying to remember the
other victims of backlash after 9/I1 and to keep the effort moving forward of sharing, educating and
welcoming people to promote understanding and diversity and the oneness of God").
164. On May 1, 2003, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced the Local Law Enforcement
Enhancement Act of 2003 (LLEA), which would add actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender,
and disability to federal hate crime laws, and would authorize greater federal assistance to be provided
to local law enforcement officials investigating or prosecuting hate crimes. S. 966, 108th Cong. (2003).
(Federal law currently addresses only certain bias crimes motivated by race, color, religion, or national
origin. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (2004).) In introducing the bill, Senator Kennedy made brief
mention of post-September II hate violence, see 149 CONG. REC. S5652-53 (daily ed. May 1, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy), but there has been little public demand or media coverage linking such
violence to a need for enhanced hate crime legislation. LLEA was approved by the Senate on June 15,
2004. S. Amdt. 3183 to S. 2400, 108th Cong. (2004).
165. In February, 2003, a private bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to allow
Waqar Hasan's wife and four children to gain lawful permanent resident status. The bill was passed by
the House of Representatives on July 6, 2004, and after being sent to the Senate, was referred to the
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the survivors of those killed by it, have been excluded from eligibility for
virtually all of the major September 11-related charities,'66 suggesting a
hierarchy of loss that places the victims of hate violence at the bottom.
Whereas the name "Matthew Shepard" is now synonymous with anti-gay
bias, the names Waqar Hasan, Balbir Singh Sodhi, and Vasudev Patel con-
jure up nothing more than the vague image of a terrorist.'67
Undoubtedly the unique political moment of September 1 1 and its
aftermath accounts for some of this difference in public response to the
hate violence.'68 Most Americans had barely begun to comprehend the loss
of life exacted on September 1 1 when the hate violence began. It is, then,
perhaps understandable that a nation consumed with the trauma of the ter-
rorist attacks might be inattentive to further "collateral" loss of life.
However, it is not merely that the magnitude of the September 11 attacks
made them more worthy of condemnation and its victims more worthy of
sympathy. Rather, the difference in public response to the post-September
1 1 hate violence can be attributed to a difference in how hate violence
against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians was understood as compared
with previous instances of hate violence.
Despite the seeming conformity of post-September 11 hate violence to
the hate crime prototype, several important distinctions exist in how the
violence against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians has been compre-
hended. Unlike prototypical hate crimes, the perpetrators of post-
September 11 hate violence have not been understood as acting out of per-
sonal bias, but instead out of bias which resonated with much of the coun-
try. Because the perpetrators' emotional reactions of anger and desire for
retribution were shared by much of the public, the perpetrators' bias was
not understood to be deviant or irrational, even though their actions may
have been so understood. And finally, whereas in the prototypical hate
crime the perpetrator is understood to be enacting violence for the sole
purpose of telegraphing harm to a target group, here the perpetrators' mo-
tives were understood to be both revenge and intimidation. As such, they
were subject to a different, and lesser, moral scrutiny. Each of these
Senate Judiciary Committee. As of August 24, 2004, the bill was still pending before that committee.
H.R. 867, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Frank Trejo, Slain Man's Family in Limbo; Wife, Kids Hoping
For Legal Status After 9-11 Revenge Attack in Dallas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 13, 2003, at 28A;
Tara Petersen, Rallying in the Rain for Hasan's Family, SENTINEL, Sept. 18, 2003, at
http://ebs.gmnews.com/news/2003/0918/Front-page/003.html.
166. See Jon Yates, Prejudice Also Claimed Victims in Sept. 11's Wake, CHI. TRIa., May 5, 2002,
at I (reporting that victims of post-September 11 hate violence have been ruled ineligible for the $930
million American Red Cross Liberty Fund, among others).
167. Ahmad, supra note 70, at 107.
168. The fact that, unlike the prototypical hate crime, post-September 11 hate crimes have not
featured gruesome violence might also help to explain the difference in how post-September 11
violence has been understood, but I do not believe this accounts for the difference fully.
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distinctions between popular understandings of post-September 11 vio-
lence and previous hate crimes is taken up below.
A. The Perpetrators'Biases Were Not Personal, But Broadly Shared.
First, it is difficult to understand as personal to the perpetrator the bias
against "Muslim-looking" people to which the violence is attributed.
Rather, biases against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians were widespread
in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks. 169 The condemnation of
the Byrd and Shepard killers depended upon an ability of the general public
to put moral distance between itself and the perpetrators, to disclaim racism
and homophobia as widely held beliefs, and certainly as beliefs that the
general public sanctioned. Thus, condemnation of the Byrd and Shepard
killers localized the racism and homophobia of the perpetrators, and it
permitted the public to define itself as free of such biases. While such im-
plicit claims of freedom from racism and homophobia were undoubtedly
counterfactual in 1998, a claim of freedom from bias against
"Muslim-looking" people in the immediate aftermath of September 11 is
nearly impossible to maintain. The biases of the perpetrators of post-
September 11 violence were the biases of much of the country. Thus, the
perpetrators were not understood to be acting solely out of personal ani-
mus, but out of an animus for which there was substantial social rein-
forcement available.
Nearly three years after the terrorist attacks, it may be difficult to re-
call exactly how much hostility, anger, and suspicion there was toward
"Muslim-looking" people in the aftermath of the attacks. Although evi-
dence of continuing bias against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians is
abundant, 7 ° the immediate aftermath of the attacks-the time in which the
hate violence spiked-was a moment of overwhelming and complex emo-
tionalism. This was most clearly expressed by people who found them-
selves engaging in racial profiling of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians,
despite their intellectual opposition to it. Many such sentiments were cap-
tured in the media. For example, the following was broadcast on National
Public Radio the week after the terrorist attacks:
REPORTER: Amy Chan, a struggling entrepreneur on the Upper
West Side of Manhattan, has eaten little and slept less in the last
few days, but mostly she's tormented by her own thoughts.
CHAN: I've been so ashamed of some of the feelings that I've had
since the World Trade Center disaster.
REPORTER: She's always been against capital punishment, she
says, but this week she had thoughts like these.
169. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
170. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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CHAN: Let's just get bombs. Let's just get bombs on planes. I
don't care how many innocent people get wiped out. Just level
them, whoever that is. 171
Similarly, another "person on the street" shared the following, after seeing
a man wearing a turban speaking on a pay phone near the Israeli consulate
in New York City:
I saw a very suspicious-looking gentleman-I'll be honest-and I
stared him down, as if to say, "Just what do you think you're do-
ing?" And when he saw me, he moved around the comer and went
to another phone. There was definitely that look of hate in my eyes.
There was a look of blame."'
Comments such as these reflect both anger and moral outrage. The
anger is evident from the desire to fight back ("Let's just get bombs on
planes.") as well as feelings of hatred ("There was definitely that look of
hate in my eyes.").'73 Moreover, this anger finds expression in moral terms
("I don't care how many innocent people get wiped out. Just level them,
whoever that is." "Just what do you think you're doing?" "There was a
look of blame."). Importantly, these expressions of moral outrage were not
made in the abstract, but were directed toward and enacted upon individual
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, as in the case of the individual staring
down the turbaned man in New York City. 4 Thus, the anger triggered by
the September 11 attacks found expression in moral outrage directed at
people who were thought to look like the September 11 terrorists. 75
171. Margot Adler, Profile: Reactions People Are Having to Suddenly Being Suspicious ofAnyone
Who is Muslim or Arab, (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Sept. 20, 2001) (emphasis added). The reporter
began this story by relating that while in the airport she was giving special scrutiny to men who
appeared to be from the Middle East. "Shocked to find myself engaging in racial profiling," she states,
"I find that I am not alone." Id.; see also Verhovek, supra note 32, at Al (emphasis added):
Ron Arnold understands racial profiling. "I'm a black American, and I've been racially
profiled all my life," said Mr. Arnold, a 43-year-old security officer here, "and it's wrong."
But Mr. Arnold admits that he is engaging in some racial profiling himself these days, casting
a wary eye on men who look to be of Middle Eastern descent. If he saw a small knot of such
men boarding a plane, he said: "I'd be nervous. It sickens me that I feel that way, but it's the
real world."
172. Adler, supra note 171 (emphasis added).
173. See Linda J. Skitka et al., Political Tolerance and Coming to Psychological Closure
Following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks: An Integrative Approach, PERSONALITY AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 13, on file with CALIF. LAW REV.)
(assessing anger of respondents in nationwide poll four days after September II by degree to which
they felt angry, a desire to fight back, outrage, and hatred in response to the terrorist attacks).
174. It is possible, if not likely, that this turbaned man was Sikh rather than Muslim or Arab. Many
Sikh men, who wear turbans and long beards, were targeted in post-September 11 hate violence
because they were mistaken to be Muslim. As a result, Sikhs have borne the disproportionate brunt of
hate violence in the aftermath of September 11. See IYER, supra note 12, at 14; Goodstein & Lewin,
supra note 154, at AI; Sikh Mediawatch & Res. Task Force, Common Stereotypes About Sikhs and
Sikhism, at http://www.sikhmediawatch.org/pubs/smartpub8.htm (last updated Feb. 2002) (discussing
the difference between Arabs, Muslims, and Sikhs).
175. Such feelings of anger and suspicion found support and reinforcement in the media. For
example, Peggy Noonan, a former speechwriter for Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, recounted
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Comments such as these also suggest that emotion, and anger in par-
ticular, had overwhelmed principled commitments to liberal ideals. This is
evident when the first speaker confesses her shame at "the feelings that
I've had since the World Trade Center disaster," and when the second
speaker acknowledges her own cognitive dissonance by stating "I'll be
honest." Implicit in these apologies is an acknowledgment that the felt re-
sponse to the September 11 attacks was, for many, at odds with their intel-
lectual ideals of racial equality and color blindness. The fact that the
speakers feel shame over their emotion and express such shame by way of
confession suggests the involuntary nature of their emotional responses;
these are feelings beyond their control. The emotion of the post-September
11 perpetrators, then, was resonant with the emotion of many Americans in
the aftermath of the attacks.
Recent social science research supports the conclusion that the anger
and consequent moral outrage expressed in the excerpts above were com-
mon emotional reactions among Americans in the immediate aftermath of
September 11. In one study, in which respondents were contacted only
in the Wall Street Journal her encounter with two "Mideastern looking men" videotaping St. Patrick's
Cathedral in New York a few days after September II. Peggy Noonan, Profiles Encouraged, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001, at http://www.peggynoonan.com/article.php?article=72 (last visited Apr. 12,
2004) (article originally printed in the Oct. 19, 2001, edition of the Wall Street Journal). Noonan
describes how she and her son stared at these men and "eyeballed them hard." Undeterred, the men
"stared back at us in what I thought an aggressive manner: a deadeye stare, cold, no nod, no upturned-
chin hello." Id. Regretting not having confronted the men, Noonan writes the following:
I think there are a lot of "sleeper cells"-not a few, as we all hope, but a lot. I think
some of them are in Queens and Brooklyn and Manhattan, and in Jersey City and elsewhere
in New Jersey. Boston, too. Maybe some are in the capital or Virginia or Maryland. Maybe
some of those who delivered anthrax to the U.S. Capitol took a taxi. Maybe on the other hand
they took the shuttle from LaGuardia. Certainly we know some cell or cells are in Florida.
I think some cell members may not be sure what their next move is. They're not sure of
their next assignment. They haven't been told, or they haven't, perhaps, chosen. I think cell
members have been going around taking home movies of potential targets. I suspect they've
been downloading them into computers and shooting them off to Osama and his lieutenants
in the caves. I suspect they've been building a video library of places they might hit over the
next few months and years and decade. And I think once they take one of the targets down
they'll happily return to the scene of the crime, take a nice tourist-type videotape of the crater
they made-they'll tell the cops they want to record the brave rescue workers-and send it
triumphantly home.
Id. Noonan concludes, "In the past month I have evolved from polite tip-line caller to watchful
potential warrior." Id.
On the one hand, this passage can be read as an expression of fear. The concern that there may be
other sleeper cells waiting to spring attacks upon the country is real. See Jerry Seper, Islamic Extremists
Invade U.S., Join Sleeper Cells, Wash. Times, Feb. 10, 2004 (reporting that government officials
believe there are hundreds of operatives in sleeper cells in forty states) at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20040209-115406-6221r.htm. On the other, Noonan stokes
the anger that many people were already feeling toward Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, an anger
deriving not merely from the violence done on September 11, but by a felt sense of betrayal by a group
of strangers in our midst. By focusing on the brazenness of the terrorists she suspects still to be in the
country, Noonan does more than reinforce feelings of vulnerability; she urges a moral outrage at the
audacity of these "Mideastern looking men," and counsels active confrontation with them. Thus she is
transformed into a "potential warrior."
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days after September 11, 20% of the sample reported making comments
like "we should just nuke them," 38% talked about the need to go to war,
and 23% reported "trying to blow off steam" by expressing their anger
about the situation.'76 Whereas public opinion polls have consistently
shown a willingness of most Americans to sacrifice civil liberties in order
to combat terrorism,'77 as well as dramatically increased hostility to out-
groups (i.e., Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians), 7 ' this study suggests that
the high levels of moral outrage and outgroup derogation are likely the re-
sult of anger rather than fear or other associated emotions triggered by the
September 11 attacks.
The racial biases toward "Muslim-looking" people expressed by the
perpetrators of post-September 11 violence were not only personal to the
perpetrators, but rather were also broadly shared by much of the country.
These were not private biases existing solely in the minds of an isolated
few, but were consistent with prevailing biases of the day. The racially di-
rected anger and moral outrage of the perpetrators of post-September 11
violence, if not the violence itself, found resonance with the emotional re-
sponses of many Americans. Put more bluntly, the anger of the perpetrators
was the anger of much of the country.
176. See Skitka et al., supra note 173, at 20.
177. See, e.g., Nat'l Pub. Radio et al., Poll: Security Trumps Civil Liberties (Nov. 30, 2001), at
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/civillibertiespoll/011130.poll.html (finding between 51%-79% of
respondents in favor of granting law enforcement expanded powers to intercept mail (57%), detain
suspects for a week without charge (58%), wiretap telephones (68%), intercept email (72%), and
examine telephone records (79%)) (last visited Sept. 1, 2004); Richard Morin, Poll: Half of All
Americans Still Feel Unsafe; Majority Would Give Up Some Civil Liberties to Improve Security After
Sept. 11, WASH. POST, May 3, 2002, at A7; LISA FERRARO PARMELEE, INTERGROUP RELATIONS
BEFORE AND AFTER 9/I1: A REVIEW OF THE PUBLIC OPINION DATA 34-38 (The Nat'l Conference for
Community and Justice 2002) (summarizing various polls regarding civil liberties). As David Cole
argues, despite this general willingness of Americans to give up certain civil liberties, it has not been
all Americans' civil liberties that have been sacrificed. Rather, the rights of some-namely,
noncitizens-are being sacrificed for the security of American citizens. Cole, supra note 33, at 17-21.
As I argue here, there is a racial bias in the curtailment of civil liberties as well.
178. See PARMELEE, supra note 177, at 28, 32 (citing ABC News/Washington Post poll taken on
September 13, 2001, finding 43% of respondents stated the terrorist attacks would make them more
suspicious of people of Arab descent, and citing a Wirthlin poll taken within days of the attacks,
finding that 44% of respondents thought the attacks represented the desires and feelings of Muslim
American citizens toward the United States). A poll by the Council on American-Islamic Relations
published in August 2002 found that 57% of Muslim Americans reported experiencing bias or
discrimination since the terrorist attacks, and 87% said they knew a Muslim who had experienced
discrimination. Significantly, 79% also reported experiencing kindness or support from people of other
faiths. See News Release, Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Poll: Majority of U.S. Muslims Suffered
Post 9/11 Bias; More Than Three-in-Four Also Experienced Acts of Kindness (Aug. 21, 2002), at
http://www.cair-net.org/asp/article.asp?id=895&page=NR (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
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B. The Perpetrators' Behavior Was Aberrant, But Their Biases
Were Not.
Unlike the racism and homophobia attributed to the killers of James
Byrd and Matthew Shepard, the biases underlying the hate violence against
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians are not easily characterized as aberrant.
Rather, September 11 fortified a social norm of bias against
"Muslim-looking" people. Indeed, many Americans experienced anger,
suspicion, and feelings of betrayal toward Arabs, Muslims, and South
Asians not unlike that attributed to the post-September 11 perpetrators.
Mark Stroman, the man who killed Waqar Hasan and Vasudev Patel in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks, voiced a similar sentiment after his arrest,
stating, "I did what every American wanted to do but didn't."'79 Stroman
overstates the case, because a rational distinction can and should be drawn
between emotion on the one hand, and behavior on the other. It is this dis-
tinction that permitted even those Americans who felt similar anger or dis-
gust toward Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians to place moral distance
between themselves and the perpetrators of post-September 1 1 violence.
Thus, the behavior in these incidents was aberrant, just as it was in the
Byrd and Shepard killings. However, the biases underlying the Byrd and
Shepard killings found little sympathy among the public, or at least the
mainstream media; it was the perpetrators' racism and homophobia that
were found aberrant, and not only the resulting behavior. In contrast, the
biases underlying the behavior of the post-September 11 perpetrators had
broad resonance with many Americans. 80 The result was a condemnation
of the violence, but one which lacked the full moral force of those in the
Byrd and Shepard killings, as many Americans could not disavow their felt
biases against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians in the immediate after-
math of the attacks as easily as they could racism and homophobia at the
time of the Byrd and Shepard killings. 8 '
C. The Perpetrators Were Understood To Be Motivated By Vengeance
Rather Than Mere Hatred.
The prototypical conception of hate crimes casts the perpetrator as
motivated exclusively by the perpetrator's hatred for the racial or social
group to which the victim belongs. As previously discussed, that hatred is
understood as personal to the perpetrator, rather than broadly shared by
society, and as aberrant and irrational. Despite the efforts of advocacy
groups and prosecutors to frame post-September 1 1 violence crimes as
179. Pierre, supra note 10.
180. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
181. Condemnation of the post-September II killings may have served an additional role of aiding
those Americans who felt ashamed of their bias toward Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, by masking
their inner emotional response with outward expressions of disapproval.
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motivated by hatred toward Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, however,
they have been understood broadly as being motivated by a desire for
vengeance.82 Of course, vengeance for the September 11 attacks is not ra-
tionally obtained through attacks on "Muslim-looking" people, and there-
fore the violence is irrational. However, what makes it irrational is a gap in
logic, and not the underlying desire for vengeance. A desire for vengeance
found broad support among the American public, and ultimately found ex-
pression in American foreign policy'83 ; by virtue of this broadly held de-
sire, vengeance was made rational, and with it, bias against
"Muslim-looking" people.'84 Thus, the motives of the post-September 11
perpetrators were shared by many Americans after September 11, even as
the perpetrators' chosen means of achieving it were disavowed.
Where violence is understood as motivated by irrational hate, there is
little sympathy for the perpetrator and little comprehension of the crime.
The perpetrator is deemed irrational, and the crime is deemed incompre-
hensible. Such was the case with the Byrd and Shepard killings. But where
the violence is understood as motivated by an emotional desire which
many Americans share or with which they sympathize, the motivation is
not so readily described as irrational. Rather, the motivations-anger and
vengeance-are understood, even as the actions of the perpetrators are dis-
avowed. The motivations, then, are accepted as socially appropriate (which
is to say, neither irrational nor aberrant). The perpetrator therefore is un-
derstood to be expressing socially appropriate emotions in socially inap-
propriate ways.
As Lu-in Wang notes, "when a bias-motivated crime is seen as being
'rational' in some way, the bias required for condemnation becomes
invisible."'85 Here, the violence done by post-September 11 perpetrators
has not been seen as rational; to the contrary, the violence has been con-
demned as irrational. However, because the emotion motivating the vio-
lence has resonated with many Americans, this suggests that the bias
against "Muslim-looking" people has been seen as rational, even as the
resulting crime has not.
This direct relationship between the degree of rationality attributed to
underlying biases in bias-motivated crime and the degree of condemnation
of the crime may be seen more clearly by considering other instances of
hate violence that do not fit the prototype. For example, while the Shepard
182. See, e.g., Man Sentenced to Death for 9/11 Revenge Killing, supra note 160. The very
headline of this story, as well as its description of Mark Stroman's killing of Vasudev Patel and Waqar
Hasan, reflect and reinforce the understanding that these murders were motivated by vengeance.
183. I am referring here to both the war in Afghanistan and the broader war against terrorism.
184. Insofar as a desire for vengeance translated into bias toward "Muslim-looking" people, see
supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text, the normalization of one implies the normalization of the
other.
185. Wang, supra note 72, at 216.
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killing was roundly condemned, other anti-gay murders have found greater
public sympathy with the killer's bias. In the "Jenny Jones case," for ex-
ample, Jonathan Schmitz, a guest on a talk show, killed a gay man who had
confessed his affection for Schmitz on air.'86 Charged with first degree
murder, a jury found Schmitz guilty of the lesser offense of second degree
murder after he claimed that he killed out of embarrassment at having been
subjected to a homosexual advance.'87 That Schmitz's defense was permit-
ted, and that it had some success in the courtroom, suggests that his
"homosexual panic" defense'88 has some purchase with the public, even if
it is viewed with some skepticism. This is to say that by sympathizing with
the embarrassment Schmitz claimed to feel by being subjected to homo-
sexual desire, the jury endorsed the rationality of his anti-gay bias.
In contrast, the claimed provocation of the "black rage" defense has
been largely dismissed, and thereby rendered irrational. Black rage, the
notion that environmental factors such as racism and economic exploitation
can create a kind of temporary insanity leading to criminal conduct by
African Americans against white individuals, should be understood as a bid
for understanding racially-informed violence as rational human behavior.'89
That bid has been rejected, as in the case of Colin Ferguson, the Long
Island Rail Road shooter,' thereby enabling full and ready condemnation
of racial violence by African Americans against whites.
As discussed in greater depth below, post-September 11 violence has
featured claims of provocation as well, and I argue that those claims have
been rendered rational by way of public sympathy. 9' Thus, while post-
September 1 1 violence has been described nominally as hate crime, in light
of paradigmatic hate crimes in recent years, it has been experienced as
something else. While most Americans could easily condemn the actions
of post-September 11 violence, it seems that many, simultaneously, shared
the rage of the perpetrators. Such emotional sympathy for hate crime
186. See People v. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
187. Kara S. Suffredini, Pride and Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic Defense, 21 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 279 (2001).
188. For a discussion of this defense and its pretensions to psychiatric disorder, see id.
189. See generally PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW (1997).
190. On December 7, 1993, Colin Ferguson, a thirty-five year lawful permanent resident from
Jamaica, boarded a Long Island Rail Road commuter train in New York City and opened fire, killing
five people and injuring many others. All of those shot were white or Asian, and handwritten notes
taken from Ferguson listed the "reasons for this (shooting): Adelphi University racism, EEOC racism,
Workmen's Compensation Board. Racism of Gov. Cuomo's staff... Additional reasons for this:
Caucasian racism and Uncle Tom Negroes." Patt Milton, Race-Obsessed Loner Blamed in Train
Tragedy, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 8, 1993, 1993 WL 4570682. Ferguson also referred to "Chinese racism."
Id. See also Christopher Slobogin, Race-Based Defenses-The Insights of Traditional Analysis, 54 ARK.
L. REV. 739, 770 (2002) (discussing the black rage defense in the context of the Ferguson case).
191. See infra notes 194-219 and accompanying text.
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perpetrators is, for better or for worse, 19 2 at odds with the prototypical
conception of hate crimes. Rather than seeking to assimilate post-
September 11 violence into the prevailing framework for hate violence, I
propose viewing the post-September 11 phenomenon through a different
framework entirely; borrowing from another area of criminal law,
responses to the post-September 11 violence suggest that these incidents
have been understood not as prototypical hate crimes, but as crimes of
passion.
IV.
POST-SEPTEMBER 1 RACIAL VIOLENCE AS CRIMES OF PASSION
Ultimately, people have reacted to post-September 1 1 hate violence
differently than they have to earlier instances of hate violence because it
has been understood as a fundamentally different class of crime. The kill-
ings of James Byrd, Mathew Shepard, and other hate crime victims were
deemed incomprehensible either because the underlying ideologies-white
supremacy, and to a lesser degree, homophobia-were rejected by the
mainstream, their persistence in American society notwithstanding, 193 or
because the desire to inflict severe bodily harm on the basis of such ideo-
logical commitments defied general understanding. In contrast, the killings
of Balbir Singh Sodhi, Waqar Hasan, and the many others after September
11, while deplored as wrong, have been understood as the result of a dis-
placed anger, that underlying anger being one with which many Americans
sympathized and agreed.'94 The perpetrators of these crimes, then, were
guilty not of malicious intent, but of expressing a socially appropriate (and
approved) emotion in socially inappropriate ways. We can view the hate
crime killings before September 11 as having been understood as crimes of
moral depravity, while the hate killings since September 11 have been un-
derstood as crimes of passion.
The term "crime of passion" is used both popularly and legally to
describe the killing of an intimate when the motive for such killing is un-
192. Lu-in Wang has argued that the normative power of paradigms of hate crime perpetrators has
blinded many people to the fact-specific context of individual crimes. See Wang, The Complexities of
"Hate," supra note 125, at 816-17.
193. Of course, one can find countless examples of the gap between rhetorical condemnation of
white supremacy and homophobia, and the substantive commitments to them. This is especially true of
homophobia, as gay and lesbian equality remains a deeply contested political issue, as evident in the
recent push for a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. See S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003)
(declaring that "marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman"
and prohibiting the interpretation of state or federal laws as requiring government to confer marital
status on "unmarried couples or groups"); H.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003). 1 do not mean to suggest
that homophobia has been deemed unacceptable as a general matter. Rather, in the specific context of
the Shepard killing, many people expressed a willingness to distance themselves from homophobia, if
only in that brief, historical moment.
194. 1 use the past tense here because in the time that has elapsed since the September I I attacks,
emotions have cooled and changed. This is consistent with the crime of passion trope I am advancing
here. See infra notes 312-22 and accompanying text.
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derstood, if not wholly sanctioned. I introduce the crime of passion concept
here not as a doctrinal description of post-September 11 violence, but as an
analytical trope that aids in understanding the nature of this violence. As
such, my project does not call for strict application of the law of passion.
Nonetheless, some inquiry into the historical development and contempo-
rary application of the doctrine is useful, as it reveals important insights
about prevailing, popular understandings of passion and the cultural norms
implicated by them. These nonlegal understandings of passion then be-
come useful in examining post-September 11 violence and suggest how the
violence was normalized.
The crime of passion concept is captured in law as the
"heat of passion" or provocation defense to murder. At common law, the
defense provided either partial excuse or partial justification for intentional
killings in which the perpetrator was found to have been adequately pro-
voked. Either because of some offending conduct of the decedent, some
understandable inability of the perpetrator to maintain self-control, or some
combination of the two, the intentional killing is mitigated, typically from
murder to voluntary manslaughter.'95 At base, the heat of passion defense
forgives in part the intentional killing of another, out of recognition of spe-
cial emotional circumstances. The defense is a "concession to human
weakness,"' 9 6 an acknowledgment of human frailty in the face of extraor-
dinary emotional challenge.
Although formalist distinctions are often drawn between emotion and
reason (the latter being law's supposed primary concern), emotion is con-
fronted in many areas of law.'97 Crimes of passion stand as a particularly
frank acknowledgment that emotion is not merely a deviance that can be
regulated through the exercise of reason, but a constitutive part of human
experience that sometimes gains the protection of law, thereby trumping, in
whole or in part, the moral claims of reason. Put differently, passion has
honorary reason status.' 98 There are numerous examples of emotion provid-
ing the foundation for moral and legal claims, such as the role of victim
impact statements in criminal sentencings, and the relevance of remorse in
195. The question of whether the provocation defense partially excuses the provoked killer, or
partially justifies the killing, remains contested. See Joshua Dressier, Provocation: Partial Justification
or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467 (1988) [hereinafter Dressier, Provocation]; Joshua Dressier,
Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421
(1982) [hereinafter Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion]. The modem trend is to focus on the
perpetrator's self-control rather than the conduct of the decedent, and therefore to treat provocation as a
form of excuse. Dressier, Provocation, supra at 467. However, common law cases suggest elements of
both excuse and justification, as courts have inquired into both the agency of the perpetrator and the
actions of the decedent. Dressier, Provocation, supra at 467-68; Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion,
supra at 427-29.
196. Dressier, Provocation, supra note 195, at 467.
197. See Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAW I, 2 (Susan A. Bandes ed.,
1999).
198. My thanks to Peter Jaszi for suggesting this formulation.
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death penalty cases.'99 But of course, not all emotions are accorded special
status. To the contrary, many are deemed unruly and inappropriate, and in
dire need of law's discipline. In the context of crimes of passion, the ques-
tion is, why does the law forgive some emotions but not others?200
Although modem formulations of the heat of passion defense reflect
significant evolution,20 ' it is the common law conception that pervades the
popular imagination. While under traditional and modem approaches the
heat of passion defense is available in a range of situations, one specific
scenario has come to represent the archetypal crime of passion: that of an
enraged, loyal, humiliated husband killing his wife's lover upon discover-
ing the paramour in the marital bed.202 It is this scenario of female infidelity
and resulting male rage that can illuminate our understanding of hate vio-
lence in the aftermath of September 11.
From its early origins until today, the heat of passion defense has been
preoccupied with female infidelity. Emerging in the 17th century as a
means of distinguishing voluntary manslaughter as a morally less grave
killing than murder (for which the sentence was death),20 3 the defense
originally defined five categories of adequate provocation: aggravated as-
sault or battery; mutual combat; commission of a serious crime against a
close relative of the defendant; illegal arrest; and observation by a husband
of his wife2 °4 committing adultery.0 5 Whereas murder came to be charac-
terized as killing with malice aforethought, or killing by one with a callous
heart (i.e., "cold-blooded" killings), these categories of conduct defined a
less serious mental state of "heated blood" ("chaude melle").2 °6 Despite the
existence of multiple categories of provocation, a wife's adultery was con-
sidered the most severe provocation, and retains special status in
199. Bandes, supra note 197, at 2-3.
200. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense,
106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1336 (1997) (noting the essential difficulties of the heat of passion defense as
"why the law partially excuses some, but not all, emotional defendants and defines some, but not all,
passions as rational").
201. Modem formulations of the provocation defense require provocation that would cause a
"reasonable person" to lose normal self-control. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1962) [hereinafter
MPC]; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 15.2 (4th ed. 2003); see also CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER
AND THE REASONABLE MAN 25-45 (2003). In contrast to the early common law approaches, these
formulations permit the defense to be raised in any situation.
202. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 72 (1992) (noting that "English and American jurists and legal
scholars repeatedly refer to adultery as the paradigm example of provocation adequate enough to
mitigate what would otherwise be murder to a voluntary manslaughter conviction").
203. JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 20 (1992).
204. Adultery committed by the husband was not considered adequate provocation. See JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.07[B][2][a] n.185 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that gender
bias of the common law rule would not apply today); LEE, supra note 201, at 22.
205. See DRESSLER, supra note 204, § 31.07[B][2][a]; HORDER, supra note 203, at 24 (describing
four categories rather than five, omitting mutual combat).
206. HORDER, supra note 203, at 23-24.
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contemporary understandings of crimes of passion.2 °7 One can find precur-
sor developments to the heat of passion defense in adultery cases as early
as the 14th century.20 8 Writing in 1707, Holt CJ stated, "[W]hen a man is
taken in adultery with another man's wife, if the husband shall stab the
adulterer, or knock out his brains, this is bare manslaughter: for jealousy is
the rage of the man, adultery is the highest invasion of property ....
Two hundred fifty years later, H.L.A. Hart needed rely only on "'common
sense' generalizations about human nature" for the proposition that men
are "capable of self-control when confronted with an open till but not when
confronted with a wife in adultery."21
The common law conception of crimes of passion reflected a cultural
and historical understanding of each category of provocation not merely as
an infringement of rights, but as an affront to one's honor, for which some
response, even a violent response, was deemed appropriate. As Jeremy
Horder describes:
Men of honour were expected to retaliate in the face of an affront.
Retaliation would, so it was held, protect the natural honour of the
retaliator from the threat posed by the affront. This was because
retaliation would, as it were, "cancel out" the affront, and would
demonstrate that the person affronted was not cowardly, and that
he did not "lack spirit," to use Aristotle's term. The need to avenge
an affront was thought to be one of the most important "laws" of
honour.21
And so it was that the laws of homicide were brought into conformity with
the laws of honor, not excusing the exercise of violence entirely, but doing
so partially, out of law's sympathy with man's (and only man's212) need to
defend his honor.
207. See Denna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 72 ("[S]cholars repeatedly refer to adultery as the paradigm
example of provocation .... ).
208. In a case from 1341, reported by Thomas Green, Robert Bousserman discovered another man
in his home having intercourse with his wife, and killed the man with a hatchet. Although the doctrine
of provocation was not available to the jury at that time, the doctrine of self-defense was. In order to
rationalize the law of homicide with the obvious sympathy felt by the jury for Mr. Bousserman, the jury
retold an improbable tale of a trespasser entering the Bousserman home while the married couple slept,
the wife awaking and getting into bed with the intruder, and the intruder subsequently attacking
Bousserman with a knife when he awoke and sought out his wife. By this account, Bousserman's only
recourse was to kill the intruder in self-defense. HORDER, supra note 203, at 9 (citing THOMAS ANDREW
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY,
1200-18oo, at 42-43 (1985)).
209. HORDER, supra note 203, at 39 (quoting R. v. Mawridge (1707) Kel. 119, 137).
210. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 33 (1968).
211. HORDER, supra note 203, at 26-27 (footnote omitted).
212. Gender bias in the common law approach to provocation stems not merely from male
conceptions of honor, but also from a series of other gender-based assumptions. As Cynthia Lee writes:
If we look carefully at the early common law categories of legally adequate provocation, it
becomes apparent that they were created with the hot-blooded man in mind. Men were
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The relevance of a crime of passion analysis to post-September 1 1
hate violence is largely, but not entirely, metaphorical. In some cases, heat
of passion may have animated legal defenses, even if not used explicitly.213
Apart from the actual operation of the defense in the courtroom, however,
the crime of passion construct helps to illuminate the causes of
post-September 11 violence, and to explain why these hate crimes have
been popularly understood differently from previous hate crimes.
Moreover, the crime of passion construct reveals how fundamentally gen-
dered much of this violence has been, and how it has figured in the raciali-
zation of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities in the United
States.
If in the paradigmatic case, the killer's passions are rooted in the love
of his wife,2" 4 we can understand the post-September 1 1 killers' passion to
be love of nation, the killings a visceral reaction born out of patriotic fer-
vor. The feminized nation is the beloved, violated by the terrorists of
September 11, who were all men. By this account, the killings of (and
other attacks on) Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians can be understood as
the avenging of a male humiliation brought on by the violation of the be-
loved. Of course, a critical distinction is that the post-September 11 victims
are proxies for the paramour, whereas in the archetypal crime of passion, it
is the paramour himself who is killed. Resonant with the early history of
crimes of passion, the post-September 1 1 killings were a form of honor
crime, the honor being defended not only that of the feminine nation, but of
the masculine killer.
Transposing the crime of passion metaphor to post-September 11 vio-
lence in this fashion, we can understand the perpetrators acting neither with
malice aforethought nor with a callous heart, but out of quintessentially
heated blood. The terrorist attacks were assaults not just on property that
the perpetrators of post-September 1 1 violence claimed as their own, but
thought more likely than women to be subjected to an aggravated assault or battery. Men
were thought more likely than women to be involved in mutual combat. They were also
thought more likely than women to respond with violence to a serious crime committed
against a close relative.
LEE, supra note 201, at 20. Many have argued that gender bias persists in contemporary applications of
the defense of provocation. For example, Deborah Coker has argued that heat of passion doctrine
operates to reinforce male excuses and justifications for domestic violence. Coker, supra note 202.
Victoria Nourse has argued that the application of modem formulations of the provocation defense in
intimate homicides masks a set of gendered assumptions about relationships. Nourse, supra note 200, at
1387.
213. Mark Stroman did not put on an affirmative defense but made several public claims that he
was motivated by the September II attacks. At his sentencing, he waved a small American flag. See
Gaiutra Bahadur, A Hate Crime Killing Threatens New Tragedy, PHIL. INQUIRER, Jan. 12, 2003, at B I,
available at 2003 WL 2551388; Tim Wyatt, Gas Clerk Killer is Convicted; Man Blamed Shooting and
Other Incidents On Anger Over Sept. 11, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 3, 2002, at 17A.
214. Less romantically, the killer's passions could be understood to be rooted in a sense of his own
honor, as represented by the undamaged condition of the beloved.
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on their sense of honor, here expressed as resurgent nationalism. The per-
petrators' attacks, then, have been understood as undertaken in the heat of
passion to avenge the affront to their national honor, and because the
provocation is one with which we sympathize, it mitigates our condemna-
tion of the act.
The clearest evidence of the perpetrators' claimed motivations for
their violence comes from their own statements. When Frank Roque, the
killer of Balbir Singh Sodhi, was arrested, he stated, "I'm a patriot .... I'm
a damn American all the way."2 '5 A man who tried to run over a Pakistani
woman with his car declared that she was "destroying my country. 216
Mark Anthony Stroman, who killed Waqar Hasan and Vasudev Patel and
shot a third South Asian man, said he did so out of revenge for the terrorist
attacks.2"7 Brent Seever, who was convicted of shooting Ali Almansoop, a
Yemeni immigrant who had lived in the United States for thirty years, told
the police, "I was motivated by all this terroristic activity." '2t8 Such state-
ments were among the first to signal a much broader and sustained resur-
gence of patriotism in the aftermath of September 11. Describing this
remarkable transmogrification of hate violence, Robert Chang wrote, "Hate
crimes become redeployed as patriotic gestures, when belongingness is
exercised through the negation or abjection of those people marked as truly
different." '219
Implicit in the violence of the post-September 11 perpetrator are
claims of honor, loyalty, property, and violation. Notably, all four claims
are strongly inflected by gender. While in the paradigmatic crime of pas-
sion the husband acts to redeem his besmirched honor, the perpetrator of
post-September 11 violence strikes for the honor of the nation. Whereas the
husband is presumptively loyal (in contradistinction to the adulterer), so,
too, is the perpetrator of post-September 11 violence (in contradistinction
to the terrorists). Just as the wife is viewed as the property of the husband,
so does the post-September 11 perpetrator lay claim to the nation. And fi-
nally, the violation of the husband's wife by her lover parallels the viola-
tion of the feminized (and raced) nation by the terrorists, nineteen swarthy,
foreign men. Each of these claims is explored in greater detail below.
215. Goodstein & Lewin, supra note 154, at A l.
216. Stuart Millar, Violent Attacks on Arab Americans, GUARDIAN, Sept. 14, 2001, at 10.
217. See Richard A. Serrano, Deluge of Hate Crimes After 9/11 Pours Through System, L.A.
TIMES, July 6, 2002, at A8.
218. See David Shepardson, Yemeni Immigrant's Killer Convicted, DETROIT NEWS, June 26, 2002,
at C2.
219. Robert S. Chang, (Racial) Profiles in Courage, Or Can We Be Heroes Too?, 66 ALB. L. REV.
349, 364 (2003).
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A. The Perpetrators' Claims of Male Honor
Jeremy Horder's description of the early law of passion highlights the
central role that traditional conceptions of honor have played in the devel-
opment of the heat of passion defense. 2" The availability of the defense
only to men witnessing their spouse's adultery, and not to women, suggests
that this honor has been distinctly male. Thus, the law operates to forgive
men's aggression when their honor is at stake. While anger toward
"Muslim-looking" people was felt on a national level, like most violent
crime, the hate violence after September 11 has been perpetrated predomi-
nantly by men.22 ' Viewing this violence within the crime of passion
framework reveals the ways in which male honor has been endorsed and
forgiven after September 11.
In defense of their actions, several of the hate crime perpetrators
claimed to have been acting in defense of the country. Implicitly, these in-
dividuals purported to be defending their country's honor, or, as Frank
Roque, Balbir Singh Sodhi's killer, put it, to be patriots. Roque's invoca-
tion of patriotism as a defense for his behavior mirrors a broader deploy-
ment of patriotism as a shield from criticism in the war against terrorism.
To the extent that national responses to post-September 11 violence have
been muted, as I have argued, they have had the effect of condoning, if not
endorsing outright, violent excess in the name of honor.
Honor crimes in the Muslim world 223 have become a topic of great
interest in the West in recent years, but far less attention has been paid to
how violence in defense of honor operates in the United States. Lama
Abu-Odeh has observed that, in keeping with Orientalist tradition, honor is
frequently associated with the East, and passion with the West.224 The as-
sumptions here are that honor is regressive, illegitimate, sexist, and consti-
tutive of the East, while passion is progressive, legitimate, gender-neutral,
and constitutive of the West. In a similar vein, Leti Volpp has suggested
that attempts to differentiate post-September 1 1 violence enacted in or by
the United States from the violence of the terrorists reinscribe Orientalist
220. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
221. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2002: UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 232 (2003), at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/02cius.htm (noting that 82.6% of violent crime
arrestees in 2002 were men) (last visited Sept. 1, 2004); accord id. at 239, tbl.33 (showing 1993-2002
arrest statistics broken down by sex of arrestee).
222. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
223. The paradigmatic honor crime involves the killing of a woman by her father or brother for
having, or being suspected of having, sex before or outside of marriage. Lama Abu-Odeh,
Comparatively Speaking: The "Honor" of the "East" and the "Passion " of the "West," 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 287, 287 (1997).
224. Id. at 292, 304-06. Abu-Odeh goes on to argue the falsity of this dichotomy, pointing to the
growing role of honor within crimes of passion in the United States and the trend in the criminal law of
several Arab countries toward greater focus on passion.
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associations of the West with reason and the East with irrationality. 225 Hate
violence after September 1 1 bears all the characteristics typically associ-
ated with Eastern honor. As such, it should be understood as a form of
honor crime, in which national honor (patriotism) is redeemed through the
killing of another.
The racial (and racist) designs of post-September 1 1 hate violence and
governmental profiling are readily apparent, but an inquiry into the role of
honor in such violence exposes its gendered and sexualized dimensions as
well. Not unlike post-September 11 hate violence, the war on terrorism, in
both its domestic and international forms, seems animated by a militarized
defense of male honor. The militarism ascendant since the terrorist attacks
quickly recalls the familiar ties between masculinity and violence, and pre-
dictably has found expression in masculinist terms.226
Specifically, the post-September 11 defense of honor has enlisted two
methods of gender-related subordination-misogyny and homophobia-
that have long been deployed to shore up the masculine self. For example,
flyers circulating in New York, and later on the Internet, depicted Osama
bin Laden being sodomized by the World Trade Center, with the caption
"You like skyscrapers, bitch?" 227 The Associated Press published a photo-
graph of a bomb intended for Afghanistan on which an American Navy
officer had written "HIGH JACK [sic] THIS FAGS. 228 Similarly, soon
after the terrorist attacks, rumors began to circulate that Mohamed Atta and
possibly others among the terrorists were homosexuals. 229 Reports also be-
gan to circulate about homosexual practices, particularly between older
men and young boys, in Kandahar, the spiritual center of the Taliban, and
elsewhere in Afghanistan.23 °
This simultaneous invocation of racism, misogyny, and homophobia
speaks to the constitutive interrelationship of different systems of subordi-
nation. As Nancy Ehrenreich has argued, systems of subordination are
225. Volpp, supra note 14, at 1586-91; see generally EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (Vintage
Books 1979) (1978).
226. See SUSAN JEFFORDS, THE REMASCULINIZATION OF AMERICA: GENDER AND THE VIETNAM
WAR 168-69 (1989) (arguing that popular representations of the Vietnam War seek to promote
associations of warfare and masculinity).
227. Eliza Byard, Queerly Un-American, FEMINIST NEWS (Columbia U. Inst. for Research on
Women and Gender, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2002, at 6. A version of the flyer, with accompanying
music, is available at http://91 l digitalarchive.org/diganimbackup/skysca-l.swf (last visited Apr. 12,
2004).
228. Hank Stuever, The Bomb With a Loaded Message, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at CI (noting
that the photograph, available at http://www.snopes.com/rumors/bomb.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2004),
was removed from its wire by the Associated Press after protests by U.S. gay rights groups); see also
Byard, supra note 227, at 6.
229. See, e.g., Michelangelo Signorile, The Mohamed Atta Files, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 31, 2001, at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3067491/.
230. See, e.g., Tim Reid, Kandahar comes out of the closet, TIMES (London), Jan. 12, 2002, at 16;
Maura Reynolds, Kandahar's Lightly Veiled Homosexual Habits, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at A5.
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mutually supportive, operating not merely simultaneously, but in coordina-
tion with one another.231 It is therefore to be expected that one mode of
subordination will be called upon to reinforce another. The defense of male
honor represented by post-September 11 hate violence, and writ large in
the form of the government's war on terrorism, does not exist within a
purely gendered ecosystem. Rather, race, sexuality, and class permeate it as
well, such that the exercise of any one form of subordination is likely to be
inflected by all others.232 Thus, the crime of passion trope helps to reveal
the operation of gender and sexuality norms in the exercise of violence
against "Muslim-looking" people, which in turn helps to explain how such
violence has been normalized.
These persistent attempts to feminize and (homo)sexualize the enemy
underscore that what is at stake in American wars since Vietnam is not
merely national security, international order, or terrorism, but American
masculinity.233 This rendering of the terrorists as feminine, homosexual,
and deviant, and the exercise of violence against them, helps to rehabilitate
the male honor so grievously injured by the September 11 attacks. Like the
betrayed husband in the crime of passion paradigm, here, too, the country
is "remasculinized" by defining itself "in opposition to an enemy
feminine." '234 Significantly, it is an enemy racialized and sexualized as
well.235 Borrowing from Jeremy Horder's description of men of honor, this
retaliation in the face of an affront "demonstrate[s] that the person
affronted was not cowardly, and that he did not 'lack spirit' . . 236
B. The Perpetrators' Claims of Loyalty
In the archetypal crime of passion, the cuckold is presumed to be
faithful. Because the wife is viewed merely as property, devoid of agency,
in the traditional model it is not the wife who has been unfaithful to the
husband, but the lover who has violated a code of honor to which both men
were party. In the post-September 11 context, the perpetrators of hate
231. Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between
Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REv. 251 (2002).
232. Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai have noted the intersections of race and class in depictions of the
September I I terrorists. For example, they reference a picture circulating on the Internet that features
Osama bin Laden as a 7-Eleven convenience store cashier, thereby identifying bin Laden with (and as)
working-class Arabs and South Asians who frequently staff convenience stores in the United States.
Jasbir K. Puar & Amit S. Rai, Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of
Docile Patriots, 72 SOCIAL TEXT 117, 126 (2002).
233. See JEFFORDS, supra note 226, at 168 (describing use of the male Vietnam veteran as "an
emblem for a fallen and emasculated American male").
234. JEFFORDS, supra note 226, at 171.
235. As Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai describe, "[t]he forms of power now being deployed in the war
on terrorism ... draw on processes of quarantining a racialized and sexualized other .. " Puar and Rai,
supra note 232, at 117.
236. HORDER, supra note 203, at 27.
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violence act out of a self-conceived loyalty, whereas the terrorists have
clearly demonstrated their treachery.
If perpetrators of post-September 11 violence were attacking the
actual terrorists, people who were in fact involved in the terrorist attacks,
then the perpetrators' claims of loyalty would be unremarkable. However,
because the logic of post-September 11 hate violence depends upon a sub-
stitution of anyone "Muslim-looking" for the terrorists, the claims of loy-
alty are more troubling; once this substitution is made, it is all
"Muslim-looking" people, and not merely the nineteen terrorists, who are
presumptively disloyal. This broad ascription of disloyalty reinscribes per-
sistent, racialized anxieties about immigrant loyalty.237 Asian Americans, in
particular, have long been suspected of divided, if not clandestine, loyal-
ties, as epitomized by the incarceration of 120,000 Japanese Americans
during World War II, on the basis of wholly unsubstantiated claims of dis-
loyalty.238 More recently, the federal government's prosecution of Wen Ho
Lee, the Chinese American nuclear scientist, on suspicion of sharing nu-
clear secrets with China, revived old anxieties about Asian American dis-
loyalty. 9 Similarly, the profiling of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians at
borders, in airports, and even after lawful admission to the United States, 24 °
casts these communities as presumptively untrustworthy, disloyal, and
threatening to the nation. Again, it is not merely that governmental policies
encode pre-existing suspicions of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian loyalty
(although these exist as well), but that they are vital to the construction and
maintenance of the "Muslim-looking" construct and the presumption of
suspicion.
The U.S. military's recently aborted prosecution of James Yee, a
Muslim chaplain at Guantanamo Bay, provides fresh evidence of the gov-
emment's role in reinscribing persistent mythologies of Asian American
disloyalty, and creating newer ones with regard to Arabs, Muslims, and
South Asians. Yee, a Chinese-American graduate of West Point who con-
verted to Islam, was arrested on September 10, 2003, apparently on suspi-
cions of his involvement in an espionage ring.241 He was eventually
237. See Gotanda, supra note 74.
238. For general history of Japanese American internment, see LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIGHTING A
WRONG: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988 (1993); MIN9
OKUBO, CITIZEN 13660 (1983); MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1976); Chris K. |jima, Reparations and the "Model Minority"
Ideology of Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the Return to Original Humiliation, 19 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 385 (1998).
239. For a discussion of racialization of Chinese Americans as "foreign" in the Wen Ho Lee case,
see Gotanda, supra note 74, at 1692-94, 1698.
240. See supra notes 16-63 and accompanying text.
241. Neil A. Lewis & Thom Shanker, As Chaplains' Spy Case Nears, Some Ask Why It Went So
Far, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004, at Al; Eric Lichtblau, Atmy Cleric Who Ministered to Detainees is
Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, at A24.
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charged with two counts of disobeying orders, for taking classified materi-
als home and wrongly transporting classified information, and was kept
shackled in a maximum security facility while the charges were pending.242
Charges of adultery and keeping pornography on a government computer
were later added, though all charges were dismissed within a matter of
months.243 The fanfare with which Yee was initially prosecuted and the
subsequent steady deterioration of the government's case mirrored the
prosecution of Wen Ho Lee," and helped to conjoin the history of per-
ceived Asian American disloyalty with the newly ascendant narrative of
Arab, Muslim, and South Asian threat.
Suspicions of Asian American and now Arab, Muslim, and South
Asian disloyalty are especially pernicious because they continue well be-
yond the attaining of juridical citizenship. Wen Ho Lee was a U.S. citizen,
as were the vast majority of Japanese Americans interned during World
War 11.245 Thus, the claims of loyalty and disloyalty attending post-
September 11 violence reinforce the construction of some racial communi-
ties as "perpetual foreigners, 246 incapable of full assimilation into the
United States, or in any event, undesirable as citizens because of their
questionable loyalties.
Though loyalty has, once again, established a dividing line between
citizen and noncitizen, this time it has done so in racialized terms. As Leti
Volpp argues, "The 'imagined community' of the American nation, consti-
tuted by loyal citizens, is relying on difference from the 'Middle Eastern
terrorist' to fuse its identity at a moment of crisis.""24 Thus, a racialized
identity of loyal citizens is consolidated in opposition to the presumptively
disloyal identity of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians. The effect is to ex-
clude Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians from the nation-state, if not
242. Neil A. Lewis, Lawyer Upset By Treatment of Ex-Chaplain For Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2003, at A14; Eric Schmitt, Ex-Chaplain With Detainees is Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at
A10.
243. Lewis & Shanker, supra note 241; Neil A. Lewis, Charges Dropped Against Chaplain, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A l. The Army reprimanded Yee on the adultery and pornography matters. See
Reuters, Army Rebukes Muslim Chaplain Over Adultery and Pornography, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2004,
-at A20. He has appealed the reprimand, and seeks a formal apology from the military. See Associated
Press, Army Chaplain Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at A 17.
244. See Sarah Kershaw, Guantanamo Chaplain and His Wife Speak Out, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2003, at A24 (noting comparison between Yee and Wen Ho Lee cases).
245. See HATAMIYA, supra note 238, at 7 (noting that 77,000 of the approximately 120,000
persons of Japanese ancestry who were interned were U.S. citizens); WEN Ho LEE, MY COUNTRY
VERSUS ME (2001).
246. See Hing, supra note 13, at 444-45; Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional
Immigration Law: Citizenship and Race After September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 871, 879 (describing
racialization of citizenship); Saito, supra note 94, at 21 (2001) (discussing perpetual foreignness as a
factor in post-September 11 racialization of Arab Americans).
247. Volpp, supra note 14, at 1595 (footnote omitted).
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physically, then in terms of the rights they enjoy within the territorial
United States.248
Importantly, claims of loyalty situate the perpetrator of post-
September 11 violence as innocent, in contrast to the wrongdoing of the
disloyal "Muslim-looking" person. Attention and blame is shifted entirely
to the conduct of the other, thereby positioning the perpetrators as victims.
Such claims of innocence echo those made by the nation as a whole in the
aftermath of September 11.
C. The Perpetrators' Claims to Property
The 17th century conception of adultery as legally adequate provoca-
tion posited the wife as the property of her husband. The affront to the hus-
band's honor was an offense to property, albeit property of the highest
order.249 As Victoria Nourse has observed, adultery as a source of provoca-
tion "enforc[ed] rules of gender relations grounded in an older idea of
property.2 50 Similarly, the attacks of September 11 have been understood
as attacks on the territory, or physical property, of the United States.
Indeed, one of the most offensive aspects of the September 1 1 attacks is,
arguably, that they occurred on American soil. The perpetrator of post-
September I I violence lays claim to the nation not only as his beloved, but
as his possession; retribution for injury to property requires first claiming
that property as one's own. Again, this claim by itself is uncontroversial;
the nation arguably is susceptible to multiple claims of ownership.
However, the problem with this claim resides, once more, in its substitu-
tion of all "Muslim-looking" people for the terrorists.
By virtue of this substitution, it is not merely the nineteen terrorists
who are excluded from ownership in the United States, it is all Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians who are dispossessed of their own claims on
the nation. The question raised here is, "who is constitutive of the nation?"
Post-September 11 hate violence communicates who is not-namely,
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians. The post-September 11 violence sig-
nals that whether citizens or not, whether here legally or not, the ties that
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians have to the United States are insuffi-
cient for these communities to claim full ownership. What renders them
248. As Volpp writes, "Those who appear 'Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim' and who are
formally citizens of the United States are now being thrust outside of the protective ambit of citizenship
as identity." Volpp, supra note 14, at 1598.
249. See HORDER, supra note 203, at 24 n.8 (noting that the traditional killing of the male adulterer
rather than the adulterous wife "reflected the view.., that wives were men's property, not capable of
rational moral decision-making, and thus not to be fully blamed for having been seduced"); Id. at 39
(quoting Holt CJ as stating that "a man cannot receive a higher provocation" than catching another man
in the act of adultery with his wife).
250. Nourse, supra note 200, at 1341.
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categorically ineligible for full status is their racial position as
"Muslim-looking" individuals.
D. The Perpetrators' Claims of Violation and Betrayal
Inherent to the provocation in the archetypal crime of passion is the
notion of violation. Importantly, it is not the wife's rights or interests that
the law understands as violated, but those of the husband. The clear impli-
cation is that the lover, and not the wife, has committed an injustice against
the husband. Drawing upon Aristotle's conception of the unjust man,
Jeremy Horder argues that in the context of crimes of passion, wherein a
man provokes another by committing adultery with his wife, "he commits
injustice through taking unfair advantage." '251 The feeling of unfair advan-
tage presumes a fixed set of rules to which both men were party, but which
one-the lover-has violated. The cuckold's claim of violation, then, ex-
presses a deeper feeling of betrayal. In the post-September 11 context, we
can similarly understand the sense of betrayal the perpetrators feel as the
taking of unfair advantage. Whereas the shared set of rules violated in the
archetypal crime of passion was a code of honor, in the post-September 11
context it might be understood as the immigration laws. By virtue of the
rule of fungibility, all "Muslim-looking" people are taking or have taken
unfair advantage. More broadly, the resulting immigration restrictions have
affected not only immigrants from Muslim countries, but instead have
spilled over onto all immigrants. 52
The claim of betrayal made here is related to, yet distinct from, the
claim of loyalty. Whereas the post-September 11 perpetrator's claim of
loyalty frames all "Muslim-looking" people as presumptively disloyal,
such prospective disloyalty results from the feeling of betrayal the
September 11 attacks generated.
The betrayal exercised by the nineteen terrorists is obvious. Just as the
cuckold feels foolish for having trusted in the male code of honor, so, too,
did many Americans, including the post-September 11 perpetrators of vio-
lence, feel duped by those who took advantage of the relative permissive-
ness of American immigration laws. Sixteen of the nineteen hijackers were
251. HORDER, supra note 203, at 49.
252. This has included, inter alia, restrictions on student visas, see infra note 259 and
accompanying text, restrictions on bond release, see supra note 46 and accompanying text, and policies
of mandatory detention of Haitian asylum seekers, see supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
Moreover, as Kevin Johnson has argued, increased immigration enforcement, new citizenship
requirements for employment, and increased local involvement in immigration enforcement are likely
to have a collateral effect on other immigrants, and Mexicans in particular. Kevin R. Johnson,
September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849
(2003). As Johnson notes, past anti-terrorism reform of immigration law, in the aftermath of the
Oklahoma City bombing, had grave consequences for Mexican immigrants. Id. at 852-55 (discussing
the impact of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996).
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in the United States legally. Three had entered the United States legally,
but subsequently overstayed their visas." 3 One entered the United States on
a student visa, but never attended school.254 Moreover, two of the hijackers,
who were on tourist visas, applied to adjust to student visas and subse-
quently studied at a flight school.255 It is therefore not surprising that many
would feel that the September 11 attacks abused American hospitality.
The post-September 11 attribution of the betrayal of the nineteen ter-
rorists to all "Muslim-looking" people implicates a larger question of the
relationship of immigrants to the nation. The sense of betrayal communi-
cated by the post-September 11 violence prefigured a national anxiety
about how open and trusting the American society should be. Thus, claims
of betrayal, writ large and held by the nation, have provided the justifica-
tion for a massive overhaul of immigration law and policy. Specifically,
immigration law, which previously represented an uneasy balance between
service to immigrants and enforcement against them, has been recast as a
matter of national security. This fact is represented most clearly in the dis-
mantling of the INS as an organ of the Department of Justice, and in its
reconstitution as part of the newly created Department of Homeland
Security.26
Immigration has long been a divisive issue in the United States, with
immigration restrictions alternately relaxed and tightened in response to
economic, political, cultural, and humanitarian concerns. A narrative of "a
nation of immigrants" coexists uneasily with histories of xenophobia, anti-
Semitism, and racism in American immigration policy.25 7 The claim of
253. See Mike Allen & Eric Pianin, Bush Seeks Tighter Rules on Entry; Plan Would Track
Students, Step Up Efforts to Deport Suspects, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2001, at Al.
254. Id.
255. See Dan Eggen & Mary Beth Sheridan, Terrorist Pilots' Student Visas Arrive, WASH. POST,
Mar. 13, 2002, at Al.
256. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. While the changes
in immigration law and enforcement since September 11 are dramatic, they fit into a larger pattern of
restriction, criminalization, and punishment in immigration law that predates the terrorist attacks. In
particular, massive immigration reform in 1996 constituted what Peter Schuck termed "the most radical
reform of immigration law in decades-or perhaps ever." PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS,
AND IN-BETWEENS 143 (1998). It was in that year that Congress passed, and President Clinton signed,
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 12134
(1996), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). In addition, welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996 denied most
public benefits to legal immigrants. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. Some, though not all, of these benefits were later
restored. See Noncitizen Benefit Clarification and Other Technical Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-306, 112 Stat. 2926.
257. The period of Asian exclusion, which began in 1882 and continued for decades thereafter,
stands as a signal example of racism and xenophobia. Restrictions were first imposed on Chinese
immigrants, starting with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Concerns about Japanese immigration led
to the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907-08, under which the Japanese government refused to allow
laborers to immigrate to the United States. Growing Indian immigration led to the creation of the
Asiatic Barred Zone and prohibitions on nearly all immigration from Asia. These restrictions on Asian
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betrayal made by the perpetrators of post-September 1 1 violence threatens
to shift this debate significantly by bolstering nativist appeals. The Bush
administration made exactly such an appeal in reviving the age-old trope of
the treachery of immigrants--of all immigrants, and not just those who are
"Muslim-looking"-to support new immigration restrictions in the after-
math of September 11. George W. Bush made this clear six weeks after the
terrorist attacks, when he announced his intention to tighten the immigra-
tion laws: "Never did we realize then that people would take advantage of
our generosity to the extent they have." '258
Not surprisingly, student visa rules were among the first, but hardly
the last, to be tightened." 9 Moreover, although many of the reforms racially
target Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, in other instances the
Administration has cynically exploited a national feeling of betrayal to
punish immigrants as immigrants, even when no plausible connection to
terrorism exists. The announcement of the Department of Justice to manda-
torily detain Haitians seeking asylum on U.S. shores without the opportu-
nity for bond because of their purported threat to national security
exemplifies this phenomenon. 6
Returning to the crime of passion analogy, one can understand post-
September 11 violence as dramatizing both the nation's ambivalence to-
ward immigrants and the dangerous tilt against them that has followed.
Considering a second iteration of the crime of passion motif illuminates
this relationship. Although the archetypal crime of passion consists of the
husband killing his wife's paramour upon discovering their adultery, the
provocation defense has also been made available in instances where the
husband kills the wife and not the lover.261 Unlike the archetypal scenario,
this version presumes that the wife has agency and is therefore blamewor-
thy.262 Moreover, it presumes that there once existed a love relationship
immigration were accompanied by a variety of state and federal laws restricting the rights of Asian
immigrants in the United States. For a discussion of this history, see Chin, supra note 53, at 12-15. The
refusal of the United States to accept Jewish refugees fleeing Europe in the lead-up to World War II-
purportedly because the relevant immigration quotas had already been filled-has been interpreted,
rightly in my mind, as motivated by anti-Semitism. See Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 193 (2003); see generally HENRY L. FEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RESCUE: THE ROOSEVELT
ADMINISTRATION AND THE HOLOCAUST, 1938-1945 (1970); SAUL S. FRIEDMAN, No HAVEN FOR THE
OPPRESSED: UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD JEWISH REFUGEES, 1938-1945 (1973); GORDON THOMAS
& MAX MORGAN-WITTS, VOYAGE OF THE DAMNED (1974).
258. Allen & Pianin, supra note 253, at A4.
259. See Victor C. Romero, Noncitizen Students and Immigration Policy Post-9/l1, 17 GEo.
IMMIGR. L.J. 357 (2003) (summarizing noncitizen student-related provisions of the USA PATRIOT
Act, the Border Commuter Student Act of 2002, and the proposed Capital Student Adjustment Act).
260. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
261. See Coker, supra note 202, at 109, 111 (discussing the application of heat of passion defense
to men who kill their wives and allege adultery as their provocation).
262. See HORDER, supra note 203, at 24 n.8.
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between husband and wife and that the betrayal of the wife, not an outside
force, violated that love.
Transposing this iteration of the crime of passion motif to post-
September 11 violence, we can understand the immigrant not as the inter-
loping paramour, but as the beloved wife, and the post-September 11 per-
petrator as the husband, but more importantly, as a stand-in for the
nation.263 By this account, the immigrant was once beloved by the nation,
but the immigrant has betrayed the "generosity" and the kindness of the
nation, thereby inviting retribution. Thus, both iterations of the crime of
passion motif may be at play in post-September 11 violence, capturing the
duality of American thought regarding immigrants, and expressing a sense
of betrayal in both regards: on the one hand, the immigrant-as-enemy has
engaged in exactly the treachery of which immigrants have long been sus-
pected, and on the other hand, the trust placed in immigrants has been




Accepting that intense and complicated emotion triggered by the ter-
rorist attacks motivated the post-September 11 violence, the question still
remains as to whether such emotion has warranted forgiveness, in whole or
in part, of the perpetrator's conduct. The provocation defense is a legal
embodiment of emotional judgment,2" lending sympathy to some acts of
homicide, while denying it to others. Of course, the law can construe all
homicides as motivated by passion of some sort, which raises the question
of which passions merit the law's sympathy and which do not.
As Victoria Nourse has argued, when the law metes out punishment, it
expresses emotional judgments as to the underlying crime. 26' By punishing
a rapist, for example, the law expresses an emotional judgment that rape is
wrong and worthy of retribution. Where a crime of passion is involved,
"the provoked killer's claim for our compassion is not simply a claim for
sympathy; it is a claim of authority and a demand for our concurrence. '"266
Where the law does in fact share the provoked killer's judgments as to
wrongfulness and blameworthiness, then the provocation defense ought to
be made available. Put another way, the law of passion should apply where
a shared set of values mediates state and individual violence. To do
263. The language used by the perpetrators of post-September 11 violence strongly suggests that
many of the perpetrators viewed themselves as the nation's representatives. See supra notes 215-18 and
accompanying text.
264. See Nourse, supra note 200, at 1392.
265. Id. at 1393.
266. Id.
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otherwise would render the law incoherent; it cannot be that an emotional
judgment is legitimate when made by the law, but not when made by an
individual actor.267 If one accepts that law is at times an expression of
popular will,268 then the law of passion gives partial excuse to conduct that
most people would themselves excuse. Such value symmetry is necessary
in order to ensure the coherence of law. "[T]he more strongly [most
people] would be moved to kill by circumstances of the sort that provoked
the actor to the homicidal act, and the more difficulty they would experi-
ence in resisting the impulse to which he yielded, the less does his
succumbing serve to differentiate his character from theirs." 269 The effect
of granting partial excuse is to legitimize the values of the majority, and by
extension, of the state. This is an inverse operation to the one Lu-in Wang
described, whereby condemnation of certain conduct (such as the James
Byrd or Matthew Shepard killings) creates moral distance between the
condemner and the condemned27 °; here, an act of forgiveness reinforces
moral sameness.
It is in the province of moral sameness between individual and state
that the heat of passion defense is strongest. As Nourse writes:
[S]ome provoked murder cases temper our feelings of revenge
[toward the provoked killer] with the recognition of tragedy. Some
defendants who take the law in their own hands respond with a
rage shared by the law. In such cases, we "understand" the
defendant's emotions because these are the very emotions to which
the law itself appeals for the legitimacy of its own use of violence.
At the same time, we continue to condemn the act because the
defendant has claimed a right to use violence that is not his own.27'
As discussed previously, the perpetrators of post-September 11 violence
act out of a rage based upon claims of honor, loyalty, property, violation,
and betrayal.272 They act in the names of the victims of September 11,
whose lives the terrorists took so violently and unjustifiably. They act out
of retribution against a class of people whom they believe to be blamewor-
thy for the September 1 1 attacks. As Nourse suggests, law's sympathy
should be based upon the extent to which the law itself shares these emo-
tional judgments of blame.273
267. Id. at 1396 ("[T]he law... suffers contradiction when it refuses to embrace a sense of
outrage [on the part of a provoked defendant] which is necessary to the law's rationalization of its own
use of violence") (emphasis omitted).
268. Public choice theorists might dispute my description of law as an expression of popular will.
269. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide I1, 37 COLUM. L.
REV. 1261, 1281 (1937) (quoted in MPC, supra note 201, § 210.3 cmt. 5(a) at 56).
270. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
271. Nourse, supra note 200, at 1396 (internal citation omitted; emphasis added).
272. See supra notes 220-63 and accompanying text.
273. Nourse, supra note 200, at 1396.
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The conduct of the state with regard to Arabs, Muslims, and South
Asians since September 11 suggests that, to a significant degree, the law
shares these emotional judgments with the perpetrators of post-September
11 violence. Like the post-September 11 perpetrators, the state claims an
intimate relationship with the nation, claims the nation as its property, pro-
claims its loyalty, and feels a sense of betrayal. Moreover, the state has
purported to act in the names of the victims of the terrorist attacks, invok-
ing their memory as justification for a broad range of anti-terrorist policies.
Finally, through its policies of racial profiling and racially targeted immi-
gration enforcement, the state has, like the post-September 1 1 perpetrators,
adjudged all "Muslim-looking" people to be terrorists, and carried out acts
of retribution against them. Through its commitment to the rule of fungibil-
ity, the state lays blame in much the same way as the post-September 11
perpetrators. The rage of the post-September 11 perpetrators, then, is a rage
shared by the law.
Put slightly differently, we can understand the state and the perpetra-
tors of post-September 11 violence as possessing a shared ideology of vio-
lence. This ideology is expressed in inescapably racist terms, and depends
upon the rule of fungibility: people who look like terrorists are likely to be
terrorists, and should be punished accordingly. Importantly, the state does
more than merely condone the ideology of the post-September 1 1 perpetra-
tors. The state helps to constitute that ideology and to legitimize it through
the active involvement of the state apparatus. Thus, rather than merely en-
coding the ideology of violence espoused by the hate crime perpetrators,
the state participates in its creation and enactment.
A. A Shared Ideology of Violence
The complex interaction of the state and "private" actors in the after-
math of September 11 recalls Kendall Thomas's analysis of law and ho-
mophobic violence.274 Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Bowers v.
Hardwick,275 Thomas theorized that homophobic laws (such as the anti-
sodomy statutes applied only to gays and lesbians at issue in Bowers27 6)
and individual acts of violence (such as physical attacks on gays and lesbi-
ans in the United States) operate in tandem. Drawing upon the work of
feminist theorists as well as the theories of Michel Foucault, Thomas ar-
gued that actions of the state interpolate a specific politics into otherwise
274. See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1992). Leti
Volpp similarly relies upon Thomas's analysis, and like Thomas, invokes the work of Michel Foucault,
in her analysis of post-September 11 hate violence. Volpp, supra note 14, at 1582-83.
275. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
276. A similar statute in Texas was challenged in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
There, the Supreme Court expressly overturned Bowers, finding that the statute violated the right to
privacy. Id. at 2484 (holding that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today,
and is hereby overruled").
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private conduct. 277 Thus, while one individual may act out homophobic
violence upon the body of another, such violence is in fact an expression of
a state ideology of homophobia as embodied in, among other places, ho-
mosexual anti-sodomy statutes.
Foucault rejected a state-centered orientation on the question of power
and instead insisted that power operates in relational rather than institu-
tional terms. This is to say that power does not emanate from the state
alone, but instead multiple, unequal, and shifting points exercise power.278
Thus, Foucault situated power within a dynamic matrix in which the state
is but one among a multitude of relational players.279
Thomas adopted Foucault's view of the dispersal of power, but he
sought to connect exercises of power among private citizens to the power
of the state. Thus, he wrote, "the state power in contemporary American
society can be seen not only in the force relations involving public officials
and private citizens, but in those among citizens as well. '28° He argued that
although purportedly private conduct, homophobic violence is in fact en-
abled and underwritten by the state,281 suggesting that the state is an origi-
nal power linked inextricably to private, homophobic violence. By this
account, the state deputizes private actors with the authority to engage in
homophobic violence, so as to effect the will of the state. Thus,
"homophobic violence punishes what homosexual sodomy laws
prohibit.
282
The parallels between homophobic laws and homophobic violence, on
the one hand, and post-September 1 1 racial profiling and post-September
I 1 hate violence, on the other, are obvious. Just as homosexual sodomy
laws can be said to express "the official 'theory' of homophobia, ' 283 racial
profiling policies script a state theory of racial subordination. What is fun-
damentally different in the post-September I 1 context, however, is that it is
not only private citizens who put the state theory into practice. Rather,
through its direct engagement in racial profiling, the state is an active par-
ticipant in the process as well.
277. Thomas, supra note 274, at 1481 ("[T]he fact that homophobic violence occurs within the
context of 'private' relations by no means implies that such violence is without 'public' origins or
consequences. The apparently private character of homophobic violence should not blind us to the
reality of the state power that enables and underwrites it.").
278. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME ONE 102 (Robert Hurley,
trans., Vintage Books 1978).
279. Id. at 92-93.
280. Thomas, supra note 274, at 1481.
281. Id. at 1482.
282. Id. at 1485-86.
283. Id. at 1485.
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B. The Role of Law in Fomenting Violence After September I I
Thomas's invocation of Foucault usefully highlights three theories
about law and public-private discourse. These theories are what I term the
immanence of law, the generative nature of law, and the legitimizing force
of law. First, Thomas insists upon the pervasiveness of state power within
the social and political matrix.284 Foucault's description of power as diffuse
and multi-locational sought to disrupt assumptions about the state as the
unitary site of power. Consistent with Foucault's rejection of a statist view,
Thomas recognizes an unequal relationship between private parties whose
relative positions are differentiated by homophobia, and recognized homo-
phobic violence as a locus of power independent of the state.285 But even as
he distinguishes the distinct origins and existence of state power and ho-
mophobic violence, Thomas remains preoccupied with state power.
Whereas most typically read Foucault as de-centering the state, Thomas
focuses on how state power interacts with, and indeed predominates, other
sites of power. In this regard, Thomas works within a narrower space than
is commonly associated with Foucault, viewing state power not as exclu-
sive, but as worthy of special attention in its pervasive, overbearing con-
nection to other sites of power.286
This argument regarding the immanence of law bears more in com-
mon with the work of Nicos Poulantzas who, far more than Foucault, in-
sisted upon the predominant role of the state in the exercise of power, and
284. 1 distinguish the immanence of state power, by which I mean its pervasive influence, from the
immanence of power itself, a characteristic ascribed by Foucault: "It seems to me that power must be
understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which
they operate and which constitute their own organization .... " FOUCAULT, supra note 278, at 92-93.
285. "The terroristic dimensions of homophobic violence compel us to understand it as a mode of
power. To put the point in slightly different terms, homophobic violence is a form of 'institution,' in the
sense that John Rawls elaborates that concept." Thomas, supra note 274, at 1467.
286. As Thomas argues, "Foucault's theory of power denies neither the importance nor the
efficacy of state institutions. His is a rather more modest claim: '[I]f one insists too much on its role, on
its exclusive role, one risks missing all the mechanisms and effects of power which do not pass directly
by the State apparatus, but which often support it, transmit it, give it its maximum effectiveness." Id. at
1480 (internal citation omitted). According to Leti Volpp, the argument that dispersed power has links
to the state may amount to reading Foucault "against the grain," given Foucault's interest in showing
that power exists in sites independent of the state. Volpp, supra note 14, at 1583 n.25 (citing Hugh
Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 449, 474-76 (1996)).
Volpp notes further, however, that Foucault understood what he called "governmentality"-the
instruments of governance-as both internal and external to the state. Volpp, supra note 14, at 1583
n.25. Others have criticized Foucault for focusing on localized, micro-powers, or what he termed
"capillary" power, see FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 278, at 96-97, and thereby
ignoring the significant concentration of power that the state represents. See ALAN HUNT,
EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW 270-73 (1993);
Stuart Hall, The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 35, 52 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg, eds., 1988) (discussing
"constituted points of condensation" in contradistinction to Foucault's dispersal of power). My analysis
accepts these critiques, as I am insisting upon the significance of state power in its relation to other sites
of power in society, and social relations of "private" citizens in particular.
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in particular, in the exercise of violence.287 Because of the state's monopoly
of violence, Poulantzas argued, the instruments of state power, including
law, occupy a privileged position in structuring social and political rela-
tions.288
Second, Thomas's use of Foucault expresses the generative nature of
law,289 or what Foucault calls the "productivity" of power. By insisting
upon the productivity of power, Foucault sought to repudiate the notion
that power was primarily "negative, prohibitive and interdictive. '"290
Instead, he argued that power "produces reality; it produces domains of
objects and rituals of truth. ' 291 This is to say that power does not merely
prescribe, it creates norms of behavior, social expectations, and political
realities. Thomas described homosexual anti-sodomy laws as deeply gen-
erative in that they "actively produce and perpetuate the homophobia that
motivates the perpetrators of violence against persons who are (or are
thought be) gay or lesbian. '29 2 Thus, homophobic laws generate norms that
permit or enable homophobic violence.
Here again, Poulantzas proves useful in elaborating on the relationship
between law and violence, for he argues that law is constitutive not only of
social and political norms, it is constitutive of violence itself.2 93 Through its
own exercise of violence, and the regulation of the violence of others, the
law gives "coded form" to physical violence and organizes public violence
more generally.294 In so doing, law designates the objects of violence, and
establishes the methods for its enactment.
Thomas is careful to avoid an argument of causation, and insisted that
a causal link is irrelevant to the argument that homophobic law and homo-
phobic violence are bound up together.295 In disavowing a claim of
287. Poulantzas criticized Foucault for neglecting the role of law as an organizing power, writing:
Inevitably, Foucault is led to underestimate at the very least the role of law in the exercise of
power within modem societies; but he also underestimates the role of the State itself, and
fails to understand the function of the repressive apparatuses (army, police, judicial system,
etc.) as a means of exercising physical violence that are located at the heart of the modem
State.
Nicos POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM 77 (Patrick Camiller trans., Verso 1980) (1978).
288. Id. at 77, 83.
289. This is often referred to as the "constitutive" view of law, as it posits that rather than simply
reflecting existing social norms and relations, law plays a critical (though not totalizing) role in
constituting them. For discussion of various constitutive accounts of law, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal
Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 70-71 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983); HUNT, supra note 286; Teemu
Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 200-03 (2002).
290. Thomas, supra note 274, at 1478.
291. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 194 (Alan Sheridan
trans., 1977).
292. Thomas, supra note 274, at 1486 n.194.
293. POULANTZAS, supra note 287, at 77-78, 83.
294. Id. at 77, 79.
295. Thomas, supra note 274, at 1486 n. 194.
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causation, Thomas introduces the third, distinct theory about the relation-
ship between law and violence, namely, the legitimizing effect that homo-
phobic laws have on homophobic violence. What law produces, according
to Thomas, is the ideology of homophobia, but not necessarily homophobic
violence. While social and political forces outside the state are actively
engaged in the production and maintenance of homophobia,29 6 a state-
produced theory of homophobia carries the authority of law. Thus, homo-
phobic laws lend the imprimatur of the state to the consonant homophobic
violence undertaken by "private" actors.
Each of the three theories of state power operates in the context of
post-September 11 hate violence. First, state power has assumed a pro-
foundly more prominent position in the aftermath of September 11, as the
magnitude of the attacks redirected public attention to the state's basic re-
sponsibility of ensuring personal safety, and renewed the public's previ-
ously dwindling regard for government.297 It is not merely that terrorism
became the state's top priority. It also became the rationale for a massively
expanded exercise of state power, both domestically and internationally, in
the form of the war on terrorism. After the September 1 1 attacks, the only
acceptable topic of conversation was terrorism, and the most important
speaker was the government.298
It is in this context of newly predominant state power that we can un-
derstand the generative effects of state power. Although the Bush
Administration has rhetorically condemned post-September 1 1 hate vio-
lence,299 through its policies of racial profiling it has projected violence
against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians as a social norm. By casting all
"Muslim-looking" people as potential terrorists, the state constructs the
social meaning of those bearing Arab, Muslim, and South Asian appear-
ance as legitimate targets of violence. In the words of Poulantzas,
296. Id.
297. See David M. Shribman, A Renewed Public Interest, Trust In Government, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 16, 2001, at A13.
298. See David L. Eng, The Value of Silence, 54 THEATRE J. 85, 86-87 (2002) (arguing that the
silence of mourning in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks was quickly filled with state speech of
nationalism).
299. Even in rhetoric, however, the Administration and other government officials have been
inconsistent. As early as September 16, 2001, George W. Bush proclaimed a U.S. "crusade" against
terrorism. James Reston, Jr., Unleashing Forces of an Age-Old Cause, Opinion, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Mar. 29, 2003, at 12. On the same day that President Bush visited the Islamic Center in
Washington, D.C., and stated that Americans should not blame Muslims for the terrorist attacks,
Congressman John Cooksey of Louisiana told a radio station, a person who has "a diaper on his head
and a fan belt wrapper around the diaper" needs to be singled out for questioning. Dennis Camire,
Muslim Council Seeks Action Against Cooksey for Slur, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 21, 2001, 2001
WL 5112923. More recently, Lieutenant General William Boykin has repeatedly characterized the war
on terror as a battle between Christian civilization and Satan, and has termed the God worshipped by
Muslims an idol. See William M. Arkin, The Pentagon Unleashes a Holy Warrior; A Christian
Extremist In a High Defense Post Can Only Set Back The U.S. Approach to the Muslim World,
Commentary, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2003, at B 17.
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governmental profiling policies give "coded form" to violence against
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians. 00
Finally, the exercise of state power through the Administration's cor-
pus of racial profiling policies lends legitimacy to the individual acts of
violence carried out against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians. Because
the rage of post-September 11 perpetrators is the rage of law, state power
provides cover for what otherwise would be deemed wholly immoral vio-
lence. It is, then, not surprising that the perpetrators of post-September 11
violence would claim the mantle of the state in defense of their crimes; the
actions of the state make that mantle freely available for loan.
It is important to note that the state can legitimize acts of violence
without wholly decriminalizing them. The mere existence of criminal stat-
utes that prosecute perpetrators of hate violence does not remove or pre-
clude legitimation by the state. Criminal law as doctrine is only one
expression of state power, and criminal sanctions are only one potential
consequence of its contravention. But state power is multi-dimensional and
multi-vocal. Lax enforcement, low profile enforcement, and state policies
that implicitly or explicitly approve of bias diffuse the meaning of criminal
statutes and thereby alter the condition of the law. Such contradictions
within law's discourse create the space within which perpetrators, while
perhaps not wholly exonerated, escape the fullness of law's condemna-
tion.30 1 As Thomas stated, people who commit acts of violence against gays
and lesbians "can be said to do so under color, or more precisely, under
cover of law."3 2
Even the fact that some of the post-September 11 perpetrators have
been sentenced to death does not preclude state legitimation of post-
September 11 violence when such death sentences are viewed in the larger
context of the government's broad regime of profiling.3 3 The prosecutions
300. POULANTZAS, supra note 287, at 79.
301. Poulantzas described the potential for law's discursiveness to produce contradiction, stating,
"The state institutional structure is always organized in such a way that both the State and the dominant
classes operate at once in accordance with and against the law." POULANTZAS, supra note 287, at 85.
But, Poulzantzas argued, the image to emerge from such contradiction will inevitably support the
dominant class's representation of social reality and power. Id. at 83. By this account, although the
claim to anti-racism supported by the prosecutions of post-September II perpetrators is contradicted by
the government's corpus of racial profiling policies, the anti-racism narrative is likely to emerge as the
true reality.
302. Thomas, supra note 274, at 1491.
303. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. This governmental maneuver is not unlike recent
decisions by the federal government to seek the death penalty in cases involving white defendants.
These decisions have come in the face of sustained charges of racial discrimination in the application of
the death penalty, and can be read as a cynical method of inoculation against the charges. Although the
defensive method is different, the defense is the same. That more white people have been added to
death row does not address the operation of bias among prosecutors, jurors, and judges, just as the
prosecutions of post-September II hate crime perpetrators fail to address systemic biases that permeate
federal law enforcement policy after September 11. My thanks to Cheryl Harris for suggesting this
analogy.
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and death sentences notwithstanding, the overwhelming trajectory of gov-
ernment action has been in the direction of racial profiling. Given the mul-
tivalent nature of state power, it should not be surprising that some
government action would oppose individual acts of violence against Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians. In fact, such condemnation is necessary for
the maintenance of the government's legitimacy, not because it involves
racial bigotry, but because it intrudes upon the government's monopoly on
violence. Vigilante racism required governmental condemnation not be-
cause it was racist, but because it was vigilante. Although racism against
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians was denounced by government offi-
cials, it is difficult to take the pronouncements seriously given the weight
of racist policies adopted by the government.
Governmental condemnations can also be understood as a defense to
the charge of state-sponsored racism. By condemning the racism of others,
and of private actors in particular, the government implicitly seizes the
mantle of equality. As the arbiter of racism, it lays claim to being free of
racism itself. If it were not, the government's very ability to adjudicate the
racism of others would be thrown into question. Thus, the condemnation of
the most extreme racist acts of others obscures and normalizes the govern-
ment's own racism.
3 °4
C. The Role of Violence in Fomenting Law After September 11
While post-September 11 racial violence can be linked to the state
ideology of racial subordination toward Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians
expressed through a panoply of state practices, the history of post-
September 11 hate violence suggests that "private" violence may produce
and legitimize state power as well. The spontaneity with which hate vio-
lence against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians erupted suggests that pri-
vate violence against these communities outpaced the violence done by the
state. It might also be said that the private violence anticipated state action
in that it represented the mood of vengeance and retribution in the nation.
Serious consideration of the numerosity and severity of the incidents
against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians makes clear that these attacks
were not the isolated acts of a deviant few, but instead represented a
broadly held view of the need to respond to the terrorist attacks quickly and
severely.
The hate violence can be read as a referendum on what would be po-
litically palatable with regard to governmental responses to September 11,
authorizing incursions on previously settled rights and expectations in the
name of national security. That so many people gave violent expression to
their anger about the September 11 attacks provided a measure of political
304. This is the same dynamic at play whenever a hate crime is condemned, whether by the
government or by individuals. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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cover for state action far less extreme than extra-judicial killings, but far
more extreme than might have been tolerated previously: racial profiling,
immigrant detention, immigration restrictions, and abrogation of due proc-
ess. By this account, the people have spoken, many of them with their fire-
arms and fists. One might even conclude that the hate violence was an
indication of the level of public tolerance for "collateral" killings in mili-
tary action undertaken by the United States. Indeed, we should understand
the hate killings after September 11 as the first "collateral damage" in the
war on terrorism.
Recent comments by U.S. Commission on Civil Rights member Peter
Kirsanow further illuminate the ways in which individual acts of violence
have enabled the exercise of state power. Responding to reports of civil
rights violations of Arab Americans, Kirsanow stated, "If there's another
terrorist attack, and if it's from a certain ethnic community or certain eth-
nicities that the terrorists are from, you can forget civil rights in this coun-
try."3 5 He went on to predict that there would be "a groundswell of public
opinion to banish civil rights"306 and that "we will have a return to
Korematsu."3 °7 He concluded, "I think the best way we can thwart that is to
make sure that there is a balance between protecting civil rights, but also
protecting safety at the same time."3 8 In subsequent comments, Kirsanow
elaborated, "[n]ot too many people will be crying in their beer if there are
more detentions, more stops, more profiling,""3 9 a position clearly informed
by the public's acquiescence to and active participation in the violence al-
ready done to the bodies and rights of Arabs, Muslims, and South
Asians.31°
These remarks have been understood as a warning that critics should
tone down their complaints of civil rights and civil liberties violations by
the Bush Administration.31' One can read in them a political calculation
that popular sentiment will sanction extreme exercise of state power, and
that the state will "yield" to it. Kirsanow's comments make clear that the
deployment of either public sentiment or private violence in service of ex-
traordinary exercise of state power is not free of manipulation. Yet, state
co-optation of public acquiescence to hate violence says as much about the
305. Lynette Clemetson, Civil Rights Commissioner Under Fire for Comments on Arabs, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2002, at A14.
306. Niraj Warikoo, Arabs in U.S. Could Be Held, Official Warns, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 20,
2002, at http://www.freep.com/news/metro/civi120_20020720.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
307. Clemetson, supra note 305.
308. Id.
309. Warikoo, supra note 306.
310. Niraj Warikoo, Muslims and Arab Americans See Their Civil Rights Eroded, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Oct. 24, 2001, at 5A.
311. See Chisun Lee, Rounding Up the 'Enemy,' VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 6, 2002, at 48 (noting that
Kirsanow implied that without increased security measures there could be a racist backlash similar to
the World War II internment of people of Japanese ancestry).
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power of private violence as it does about the power of the state: the veneer
of democracy that adheres to widespread private violence and its accep-
tance lends legitimacy to drastic exercises of state power, while the sover-
eignty of the state lends legitimacy to the exercise of private violence
resonant with the values of the state. One cannot exist without the other.
Ultimately, the interdependence of state and individual violence rests
upon the symmetry of emotional judgment underlying each. Individual and
state violence are both mutually legitimizing and perpetuating; each adds
fuel to the fire of the other. The rage is not merely shared, it is lent. The
symmetry of their operations notwithstanding, individual and state violence
are, of course, not morally equivalent. The hate violence that erupted in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks forecast the state violence to come, but
those developments were not ineluctable. The state had the capacity to re-
sist such violence itself but failed to do so. Moreover, the pervasive, gen-
erative, and legitimizing forces of state action necessarily subject the
state's conduct to greater moral accountability.
CONCLUSION
At common law, the heat of passion defense is only available if there
has not been a "cooling-off' period of sufficient duration between the
provocation and the subsequent homicide. Only when such a period does
not exist is the provocation deemed adequate to merit mitigation. 2 The
law bases this doctrinal requirement on the assumption that "[f]or the
reasonable man, at least, passion subsides and reason reasserts its sway as
the provoking element grows stale." '313 Nearly three years after the
September 1 1 attacks, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent rea-
son will reassert its sway. What is clear is that passion, and not reason, has
driven much of the governmental and individual engagement in the war on
terrorism, and that such passion, shared by many and endorsed by law, has
been claimed to justify violence to the bodies and psyches of Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians. However comprehensible rash and unthinking
behavior might have seemed in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist
attacks, three years is a sufficiently long cooling-off period such that anger,
fear, and betrayal can no longer constitute governing principles for the na-
tion, its government, or its citizens. Instead, the passage of time and the
distance we have gained from the emotional confusion created by the ter-
rorist attacks demand that we engage in a more considered analysis of how
best to confront the very real threats facing the country today.
The predictions made immediately after September 11 that Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians would encounter a "backlash" of hate
312. MPC, supra note 201, § 210.3 cmt. 5(a) at 55.
313. Id. at 59.
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violence314 reflected an implicit understanding of the uncontrollable power
of emotion in times of crisis. But it is not just emotion, or more properly
emotionalism, in its generic sense, that was understood as a predictable
reaction to the terrorist attacks. Rather, it was a racially targeted emotion
lacking rational support. It would be one thing if, in the aftermath of the
attacks, large numbers of people committed random acts of violence, but it
is quite another when the vector of that violence has racial direction. This
can be distilled even further to a recognition of the enduring operation of
racism, even at a time when many people (and courts) are reluctant to ac-
knowledge any significant role of race in contemporary society. Violence
against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, and their resulting re-
racialization, remind us of the persistence of race and racism in American
law, culture, and society.315 So conditioned is the American recourse to
racial explanation, so ingrained in the country's history and contemporary
institutions, that it has taken the form not of deliberate decision-making,
but of impulse, of reflex, and of passion. Society's ready understanding of
the crimes of racial violence following September 11 demonstrates how far
our nation is from recognizing and addressing the operation of race. It is
when, in the aftermath of national tragedy, racial scapegoating is not ex-
pected that we will have made meaningful progress in healing our persis-
tent racisms.
There are some encouraging signs suggesting that governmental mis-
treatment of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians (particularly via indefinite
detention and denial of access to counsel) may finally be coming under
meaningful scrutiny by the courts, the press, and the public.316 This reflects
314. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
315. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM (1992) (arguing that racism is a permanent feature of American society).
316. Most notably, the Supreme Court has dealt the Bush Administration two serious setbacks
with regard to its post-September 11 detention policies. First, the Court rejected government arguments
that individuals held at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, facing indefinite detention, may not challenge the
legality of their detention. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). Rather, the Court held that the
detainees could challenge their detention in federal court, and that the federal court had jurisdiction to
hear the cases under the habeas corpus authority granted by 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The same day that
Rasul was decided, the Court also handed down its decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633
(2004). The petitioner, Yaser Hamdi, is an American citizen who was captured in Afghanistan and
designated an "enemy combatant" by the United States for allegedly taking up arms with the Taliban
against U.S. forces. The government maintained that it could detain Hamdi indefinitely, without
charge, and without access to counsel, but the Court concluded that due process requires that Hamdi
"be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for [his] detention before a neutral
decisionmaker." 124 S. Ct. at 2635. The Court also held that Hamdi "unquestionably has the right to
access to counsel". Id. at 2652. A third case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004), was also
decided that same day. Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen apprehended in the United States and detained
without access to a lawyer upon designation as an "enemy combatant" because of an alleged plot to
release a "dirty bomb," challenged the authority of the government to detain him militarily. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the government lacked such authority. Padilla v.
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the case, and
instead reversed and remanded on the ground that the case was not properly brought in the District of
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a broader, growing concern that the executive branch has overreached its
authority and that Congress may have acted rashly in crafting anti-
terrorism policy. This latter concern is especially evident in the chorus of
criticism befalling the USA PATRIOT Act, 317 passed by Congress a mere
forty-five days after September 11. Although trumpeted as anti-terrorism
legislation, it vastly expands police powers in terrorism and non-terrorism
cases alike."m As some members of Congress have admitted, they voted for
the legislation without having read it entirely.3"9 As of June 2004, over 330
communities have passed resolutions calling for its repeal, in whole or in
part. 320 It appears that we are in a moment-perhaps the first moment-of
reconsidering national policy on the war against terrorism, a time of con-
sidered deliberation after a period of reflexive, emotionally driven action.
We have, as a nation, begun to cool off.
And yet, the complete return of reason is neither assured nor suffi-
cient. A few recent victories notwithstanding, courts have upheld key por-
tions of the Administration's anti-terrorism policies,3 2' and it remains
unclear how much deference the Supreme Court will give the executive in
future anti-terrorism cases, particularly in light of the broad deference the
Court has typically given in immigration matters.32 Moreover, to the ex-
tent that society has questioned governmental anti-terrorism policies, it has
been on the basis of civil liberties concerns rather than civil rights con-
cerns. The courts have addressed questions such as the government's
New York, but instead should have been filed in the District of South Carolina, where Padilla is
detained.
317. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in
scattered Titles of U.S.C.).
318. For example, section 213 of the Act expands the government's ability to search private
property without notice to the owner, and section 215 of the Act expands the government's ability to
look at third party records related to an individual's activity. USA PATRIOT Act §§ 213, 215, 18
U.S.C. § 3103a (2003), 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2003). These expanded powers are not limited to cases
involving suspected terrorism.
319. See Howard Blume, The Anti-PATRIOTs, LA WEEKLY, Nov. 7-13, 2003, at 17 (reporting
that former Republican Representative Bob Barr admitted that he and other members of Congress did
not have enough time to read the entire bill); see also Kelly Patricia O'Meara, Police State, INSIGHT ON
THE NEWS, Nov. 9, 2001 (quoting Representative Ron Paul of Texas, Republican, as saying that the
text of the USA PATRIOT Act was unavailable to members of Congress prior to their vote), at
http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid= 143236 (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
320. A list of these communities is available from the American Civil Liberties Union. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, List of Communities that have Passed Resolutions, at http://www.aclu.org/
SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?lD=1I 294&c=207 (last visited June 26, 2004).
321. See, e.g., Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice, 331 F.3d 918,
932 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004) (upholding government decision to withhold
from the public names of post-September II detainees); N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003) (upholding government decision to close
certain immigration proceedings to the public); but see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681
(6th Cir. 2002), reh'g den'd, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1278 (6th Cir. 2003) (invalidating closure of
immigration proceedings to the public).
322. See supra notes 53-54, 81 and accompanying text.
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power to detain an individual indefinitely3 23 or to deny a detained individ-
ual access to counsel,324 but have not inquired into selective law enforce-
ment on the basis of race, or the substantive due process rights of
immigrants. To a large degree, the issues addressed by the courts reflect
choices made by advocates to frame these cases in civil liberties rather than
civil rights terms. Those choices, in turn, reflect strategic decisions as to
the likelihood of success of alternative legal arguments. Thus, advocates
have eschewed selective enforcement arguments, given the courts' demon-
strated hostility to such claims in immigration and law enforcement con-
texts generally.325 One can hardly blame advocates for choosing those
arguments most likely to succeed in challenging suspect governmental
policies, and yet one consequence of these choices is to perpetuate the ju-
ridical silence on race that had largely prevailed prior to September 11.
Also left uninterrogated are the substantive ties between race, gender, and
sexuality that animate the current moment of subordination.
Though it would be naive to attribute all individual and governmental
actions affecting Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians to race, it would be
equally naive to ignore its operation. Long after W.E.B. Du Bois's predic-
tion that the "color line" would preoccupy the United States in the 20th
century,326 the aftermath of September 11 reminds us that racism, and its
companion systems of subordination, remain quintessentially American
passions. They cannot be tempered until they are understood, and they
cannot be understood until they are acknowledged. The loss of life and
dignity suffered by Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians provides an impor-
tant opportunity to confront anew the passions that never seem to leave us.
Foregoing this opportunity all but ensures the ungovernability of the racial
rage of individuals, and the rage shared by law.
323. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686; Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633.
324. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2652.
325. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999)
(holding that, as a general matter, "an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to
assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation"); see also Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect against racially-motivated
traffic stops, and that allegations of selective enforcement should be brought under the Equal Protection
Clause).
326. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 12 (Gramercy Books 1994) (1903) ("The
problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line-the relation of the darker to the
lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.").
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